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Administrative Law
Delegated Legislation
Natural Justice
Judicial Review
RTI Act, 2005
Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985
Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952
📋 Table of Contents
- Topic 1 – Nature and Scope of Administrative Law
- Topic 2 – Delegated Legislation
- Topic 3 – Administrative Discretion
- Topic 4 – Natural Justice
- Topic 5 – Judicial Review of Administrative Action
- Topic 6 – Right to Information
- Topic 7 – Tribunals
- Topic 8 – Commissions of Inquiry
- Topic 9 – Regulatory Agencies
- 📝 Important Questions for Exam
- ⚡ Quick Revision Summary
Topic 1 — Nature and Scope of Administrative Law
1.1 Definition and Scope
M.P. Jain: Administrative Law is the law relating to the organisation, powers, and procedures of administrative agencies and to the review of administrative action by courts of law.
Wade: Administrative Law is the law relating to the control of governmental power. The primary purpose of administrative law is to keep the powers of government within their legal bounds, so as to protect the citizen against their abuse.
Ivor Jennings: Administrative Law is the law relating to the administration. It determines the organisation, powers, and duties of administrative authorities.
Administrative Law has grown exponentially in welfare states where governments perform vast regulatory, developmental, and social welfare functions. With delegation of legislative power, quasi-judicial adjudication by executive agencies, and discretionary power to license, regulate, and distribute state largesse, Administrative Law provides the framework for ensuring these powers are exercised lawfully.
1.2 Dicey’s Rule of Law and its Critique
- Absence of arbitrary power: No man is punishable except for a distinct breach of law established in an ordinary legal manner before ordinary courts. Government officials have no more power than ordinary citizens.
- Equality before law: Every man, whatever his rank or condition, is subject to the ordinary law of the realm and amenable to the jurisdiction of ordinary tribunals. Government officials are NOT above the law.
- Constitution as result of ordinary law: The constitution is the result of the rights of individuals as defined and enforced by the courts — not a source from which rights of individuals are derived.
- Historically inaccurate: Administrative law existed in England when Dicey wrote (1885) — he ignored prerogative writs (mandamus, certiorari, prohibition) which are public law tools
- Distorted picture of French law: Dicey misrepresented the French droit administratif (Council of State — Conseil d’État) — which in practice exercised greater control over government than English courts
- Modern welfare state incompatible: Delegated legislation and administrative discretion are essential to modern governance — Dicey’s dislike of wide discretion is untenable
- Equality was formal, not substantive: Equality before ordinary courts did not mean equality of rights and powers — the State has always had special powers (e.g., tax recovery) unavailable to private persons
- Dicey himself recanted: In the 8th edition’s introduction, Dicey acknowledged that a specialised body (like the Conseil d’État) might be better suited to adjudicate administrative disputes
The Rule of Law in India is guaranteed by Article 14 (equality before law), Article 21 (no deprivation of life without due process), and the doctrine of separation of powers. The Supreme Court has held that the Rule of Law is a basic feature of the Constitution. It means: (1) no man is above the law; (2) government must act within legal authority; (3) decisions must be based on legal principles, not arbitrary will.
Held: Every act done by the Government or its officers must, if it is to operate to the prejudice of any person, be supported by some legislative authority. The executive power of the State, co-extensive with legislative power, cannot be exercised to the prejudice of a citizen’s rights without legal authority. The executive cannot bypass Parliament and encroach on private rights by mere executive orders.
Principle: The Rule of Law in its strict legal sense means that executive action prejudicing a citizen’s rights must be authorised by law — not merely executive will.
1.3 Separation of Powers
- Personnel separation: The same person should not exercise legislative, executive, and judicial powers simultaneously
- Non-interference: One organ should not interfere in the working of another
- Non-usurpation: One organ should not usurp the powers of another
The Indian Constitution does not rigidly enforce separation of powers — it provides for a system of checks and balances. Articles 73 and 162 make executive power co-extensive with legislative power (Union and States). Article 245–246 define legislative powers. Articles 32, 226, and 227 give judiciary supervisory powers over executive action.
Held: The Indian Constitution does not contemplate assumption by one organ of the powers that essentially belong to another. The executive function of the State is to give effect to and enforce laws. The executive must have authority of law to encroach on private rights. However, to carry on trade or business (not encroaching on private rights), the executive does not necessarily need legislative authority. The executive power is co-extensive with legislative power — but it cannot be exercised to prejudice a citizen’s rights without law.
Principle: The Indian Constitution maintains a balance of powers — executive can act without law only for non-prejudicial acts; prejudicing private rights requires legislative backing.
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Topic 2 — Delegated Legislation
2.1 Meaning and Reasons for Growth
Delegated (or subordinate) legislation refers to the exercise of legislative power by a body other than the supreme legislature (Parliament/State Legislature), under authority delegated to it by that legislature. It includes rules, regulations, orders, bye-laws, notifications, and schemes made by the executive, statutory bodies, or other authorities under powers conferred by an Act of Parliament.
Reasons for growth of delegated legislation:
- Pressure on parliamentary time — Parliament cannot deal with all technical details
- Technical complexity — executive has expertise in specific fields (taxation, defence, commerce)
- Flexibility — subordinate legislation can be quickly amended; Acts of Parliament cannot
- Emergency situations — need for quick response without waiting for Parliament
- Experiment and trial — rules can be tested and modified without fresh legislation
- Local needs — local bodies better equipped to legislate for their particular areas
2.2 Permissible Limits of Delegation
Delegation of legislative power is permissible provided:
- The legislature lays down the policy and guidance (the “legislative policy”)
- The delegate operates within those guidelines
- The delegate does not have the power to repeal an Act of Parliament or override it
- The essential legislative function (determining legislative policy) is not delegated
What CANNOT be delegated: The power to repeal an Act of Parliament, the power to sub-delegate without express authority, the power to determine policy, and the power to tax (unless expressly delegated).
Court: Supreme Court of India — 7-Judge Bench
Facts: Section 7 of the Delhi Laws Act, 1912 authorised the Central Government to extend any enactment in force in any Part A State to Delhi with such restrictions and modifications as it thought fit. The constitutional validity of this provision was referred to the Supreme Court under Article 143.
Held: Majority held that delegation of legislative power to the executive is permissible as long as the legislature retains control by laying down the policy. The legislature cannot, however, abdicate its legislative function or create a parallel legislature. Section 7 was valid to the extent it permitted extension and modification of existing laws — but the power to repeal or abrogate laws cannot be delegated.
Principle: Delegation of legislative power is permissible if the legislature retains the policy-making function; essential legislative functions (determining policy, imposing taxes) cannot be delegated.
2.3 Judicial Control of Delegated Legislation
- Ultra vires (substantive): The rule/regulation exceeds the scope of the parent Act — the delegated authority acted beyond its powers
- Inconsistency with parent Act: The rule is repugnant to or inconsistent with the enabling statute
- Violation of Constitutional provisions: The delegated legislation violates Part III (Fundamental Rights) or other constitutional provisions
- Unreasonableness / manifest arbitrariness: The subordinate legislation is so unreasonable that no reasonable authority would make it
- Malafides: The rule was made in bad faith or for improper purposes
- Procedural ultra vires: Failure to follow mandatory procedural requirements in the parent Act (consultation, publication)
2.4 Legislative Control — The Laying Requirement
The “laying requirement” requires that delegated legislation be placed before Parliament/Legislature. Three types:
- Simple laying: The rule is laid before the House — no further action required; merely for information
- Negative resolution procedure: Rules are laid and come into force but can be annulled if Parliament passes a negative resolution within a specified period
- Affirmative resolution procedure: Rules come into force only after Parliament passes an affirmative resolution approving them — the strongest parliamentary control
Held: The laying requirement is generally directory, not mandatory, unless the statute makes it a condition precedent for validity of the rule. Where the statute provides for a “negative procedure” (rules come into force but can be annulled), mere failure to lay does not render the rule void. Where the statute provides for “affirmative procedure” (rules require positive approval), the laying requirement is mandatory for the rule to become operative.
Principle: The effect of non-compliance with the laying requirement depends on whether the procedure is negative (directory) or affirmative (mandatory) in nature.
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Topic 3 — Administrative Discretion
3.1 Nature of Administrative Discretion
Discretion in administrative law means the power vested in an authority to choose between alternative courses of action. When a statute confers discretion, the authority has a choice — but that choice must be exercised lawfully, reasonably, and in good faith for the purposes contemplated by the legislature. Discretion is not unfettered — it must be exercised within legal bounds.
3.2 Grounds of Judicial Review of Discretionary Powers
From Associated Provincial Picture Houses v. Wednesbury Corporation [1948 1 KB 223 (UK)], courts developed grounds for reviewing discretionary administrative action:
- Illegality: The authority acted without legal authority, or used power for an improper purpose
- Irrationality (Wednesbury unreasonableness): The decision is so outrageous in its defiance of logic or accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question could have arrived at it
- Procedural impropriety: Failure to observe procedural requirements — either those expressly required by statute, or those required by common law (natural justice)
- Proportionality: The measure adopted is not proportionate to the aim — the means must not be excessive in relation to the end
- Malafides: Abuse of power — the authority acted in bad faith, for personal benefit, or with an improper motive
- Non-application of mind: The authority failed to consider relevant factors or took irrelevant factors into account
- Fettering of discretion: The authority adopted a rigid policy without considering individual cases
3.3 Doctrine of Proportionality
The doctrine of proportionality requires that administrative action must be proportionate to the legitimate aim being pursued. The measure must: (1) be legally authorised; (2) pursue a legitimate aim; (3) be suitable for achieving that aim; (4) be necessary — the least restrictive means available; (5) not be excessive — the benefit must outweigh the burden on the individual.
In India, proportionality has become a key ground of judicial review — particularly for fundamental rights violations (Puttaswamy, 2017) and for reviewing administrative penalties.
3.4 Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation
A person has a legitimate expectation when: (1) a public authority has made a promise or representation that it will follow a certain procedure or give a certain benefit; OR (2) there is an established practice that the authority will follow. A legitimate expectation does not create a right to the benefit, but it creates a right to be heard before the expectation is frustrated. Courts protect legitimate expectations as part of fairness — a form of procedural natural justice.
A government department has for 20 years renewed the licence of a hotel without any conditions. When it decides to impose new conditions or refuse renewal, the hotelier has a legitimate expectation to be heard — even if there is no legal right to renewal. The government cannot change the practice without giving the affected party an opportunity to represent.
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Topic 4 — Natural Justice
Natural justice is the minimum standard of fairness that must be observed by any body exercising adjudicatory power over a person. In India, natural justice is:
- Implied into every statute conferring adjudicatory power (unless expressly excluded)
- Part of Article 14 (equality/fairness) and Article 21 (personal liberty)
- Required even of bodies not expressly created as courts or tribunals
The two principal rules are: Audi Alteram Partem (hear the other side) and Nemo Judex in Causa Sua (no man shall be judge in his own cause).
4.1 Audi Alteram Partem — Right to be Heard
- Notice: The person affected must be given adequate notice of the case against him — nature of proceedings, charges, and proposed action
- Disclosure of material: All material to be relied upon must be disclosed to the affected party
- Right to be heard: Oral or written opportunity to present case and rebut the case against
- Right to legal representation: Not an absolute right unless statute provides or complexity demands it
- Right to know the decision with reasons: Speaking orders — the decision must state reasons (though this overlaps with requirement of reasoned decisions)
- Right to cross-examine: In quasi-judicial proceedings, the right to test evidence by cross-examination (where evidence is testimonial)
4.2 Nemo Judex in Causa Sua — Rule Against Bias
- Pecuniary bias: The decision-maker has a financial interest in the outcome — even the smallest pecuniary interest automatically disqualifies (Dimes v. Grand Junction Canal, 1852)
- Personal bias: Friendship, enmity, or personal relationship with one of the parties
- Subject-matter bias: The decision-maker has a pre-formed view on the subject matter, or has previously adjudicated it and expressed an opinion
- Departmental bias: The decision-maker belongs to the same department that made the decision being challenged (structural bias)
- Policy bias: The decision-maker has a previously expressed strong policy preference that predetermines the outcome
Test for bias: The test is not whether there was actual bias, but whether a reasonable, fair-minded, and informed observer would apprehend a real danger of bias — the “real danger test” (replacing the older “real likelihood” and “reasonable suspicion” tests).
4.3 Exceptions to Natural Justice
- Statutory exclusion: Parliament expressly excludes natural justice by the parent Act — but courts apply it unless the exclusion is clear and unambiguous
- National security/emergency: Where confidentiality is essential and disclosure would endanger national security
- Where no right is affected: A purely administrative (not quasi-judicial) decision affecting no vested rights
- Urgency/emergency: Where immediate action is necessary to prevent irreparable harm or danger (ex parte interim orders)
- Impracticality: Where the number of affected persons is so large that individual hearings are impractical (taxation matters, public economic policy)
- Academic evaluation: Examination and assessment decisions (results cannot be challenged on natural justice grounds)
Court: Supreme Court of India
Facts: A Selection Board for the Indian Forest Service included Mr. Naquishband, who was one of the candidates for selection. The Board selected him (and others). His presence on the Board was challenged.
Held: Naquishband’s presence on the Selection Board as a member while he was also a candidate violated the rule against bias (nemo judex in causa sua). Even if the administrative act is not strictly “judicial” or “quasi-judicial” — if it affects the rights of persons, principles of natural justice apply. The earlier distinction between judicial and quasi-judicial (requiring NJ) and administrative (not requiring NJ) functions is abolished. Any authority affecting rights of persons must observe natural justice.
Principle: Natural justice applies to ALL public authorities affecting rights of persons — not just courts and quasi-judicial bodies; the judicial/administrative distinction is abolished.
Held (Administrative Law aspects): Natural justice — particularly the right to be heard — is part of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. Any procedure for depriving a person of life or liberty must be fair, just, and reasonable — which includes giving an opportunity of hearing. The impounding of Maneka Gandhi’s passport without hearing her violated natural justice and Articles 14, 19, and 21.
Principle: Natural justice is constitutionalised — it is part of Articles 14 and 21; any procedure for depriving life/liberty must include an opportunity of hearing.
4.4 Requirement of Reasoned Orders (Speaking Orders)
A public authority exercising quasi-judicial or adjudicatory power must generally state the reasons for its decision. Reasons serve three purposes: (1) they demonstrate that the authority has genuinely applied its mind; (2) they enable the aggrieved party to challenge the decision intelligently on appeal or judicial review; (3) they discipline the decision-maker to avoid arbitrary conclusions. In India, the duty to give reasons is implied from natural justice and is now a significant administrative law norm. Failure to give reasons where required vitiates the decision.
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Topic 5 — Judicial Review of Administrative Action
5.1 Scope of Judicial Review
Judicial review of administrative action in India is available under:
- Article 32: Supreme Court — enforcement of fundamental rights
- Article 226: High Courts — wider power to issue writs for any purpose (not limited to fundamental rights)
- Article 227: High Court’s superintendence over all courts and tribunals in the State
Judicial review is NOT merits review: Courts do not substitute their judgment for that of the administrative authority. They review the legality, rationality, and procedural fairness of the decision — not whether a different decision would have been better. The court asks: Was the authority legally empowered? Did it act rationally? Was the procedure fair?
Held: The jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a writ of certiorari is supervisory — not appellate. Certiorari can be issued only when the inferior court or tribunal: (1) has no jurisdiction; (2) has exceeded its jurisdiction; (3) has acted in violation of principles of natural justice; (4) there is an error of law apparent on the face of the record. The High Court cannot re-appreciate evidence on a writ of certiorari. An error of fact is not a ground for certiorari; only an error of law apparent on the face of the record is.
Principle: Certiorari is supervisory not appellate — courts review jurisdictional errors, natural justice violations, and errors of law on the face of the record; not errors of fact.
5.2 Writs in Administrative Law
| Writ | Administrative Law Use | Key Case |
|---|---|---|
| Certiorari | Quash decision of inferior tribunal/authority for jurisdictional error, NJ violation, or error of law on face of record | Syed Yakoob v. Radha Krishnan (1964) |
| Mandamus | Command public authority to perform a statutory/public duty it has wrongfully refused to perform; not for discretionary powers | Common Cause v. Union of India (2003) |
| Prohibition | Prevent inferior tribunal from proceeding where it lacks jurisdiction or proposes to violate NJ; prospective (before decision) | Anadi Mukta Sadguru v. V.R. Rudani (1989) |
| Habeas Corpus | Release of person unlawfully detained by administrative/executive authority; most fundamental — available even in emergency (except under Art. 359) | ADM Jabalpur v. Shivkant Shukla (1976) |
| Quo Warranto | Challenge a person’s claim to hold a public office — does he have legal authority? Used to oust persons illegally occupying public offices | University of Mysore v. Govinda Rao (1964) |
Held: Article 226 is wider than Article 32 — it can be used not only for enforcement of fundamental rights but for any other purpose as well. High Courts can issue writs under Article 226 against private bodies performing public functions, even if they are not “State” under Article 12. A mandamus can be issued against a private body if it is exercising a public or statutory duty — the relevant test is not whether it is State but whether it is exercising a public/statutory duty.
Principle: Article 226 (HC) is wider than Article 32 (SC) — mandamus can be issued against private bodies exercising public or statutory duties.
5.3 Ouster Clauses
Ouster clauses (also called finality clauses or exclusion clauses) are statutory provisions that purport to exclude judicial review of an administrative decision. Examples: “The decision of the authority shall be final and shall not be called in question in any court.” In India, courts have taken a robust view — ouster clauses cannot exclude judicial review of fundamental rights violations. Articles 32 and 226 confer constitutional jurisdiction that cannot be ousted by mere statutory provisions.
However, ouster clauses can limit the scope and grounds of challenge — they cannot completely exclude judicial review on constitutional grounds.
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Topic 6 — Right to Information
Object: To promote transparency and accountability in the working of every public authority and to secure to citizens the right to information under the control of public authorities to promote openness, accountability, and democracy.
Who can seek information: Every citizen has the right to request information from a public authority.
Public authority: Any authority or body established/constituted by Constitution, Parliament, State Legislature, Government notification, or substantially financed by Government funds.
Key provisions:
- Section 3: Citizens have the right to information
- Section 4: Obligation of public authorities to proactively publish information (suo motu disclosure)
- Section 6: Request for information — within 30 days the Public Information Officer must provide information (or 48 hours if life/liberty involved)
- Section 7: Disposal of request within 30 days
- Section 8: Exemptions — information relating to security/intelligence, privacy, Cabinet proceedings, judicial decisions, confidential commercial information, etc.
- Section 11: Third party information procedure
- Section 19: Appeal to First Appellate Authority, then to Information Commissioner
- Section 20: Penalties — Rs. 250/day up to Rs. 25,000 for failure to provide information
The right to information is an implicit part of the right to freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) — you cannot meaningfully exercise free speech without access to information held by the State. The Supreme Court has consistently held that right to know is part of the fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a). The RTI Act, 2005 gives legislative force to this constitutional right.
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Topic 7 — Administrative Tribunals
7.1 Concept and Advantages of Tribunals
Administrative tribunals are adjudicatory bodies created by statute to decide disputes in specialised areas — service matters, tax disputes, company law, industrial disputes, etc. They are quasi-judicial bodies distinct from both regular courts and purely administrative authorities.
Advantages of Tribunals over ordinary courts:
- Speed: Dispose matters much faster than regular courts
- Expertise: Members have specialised knowledge (technical + legal)
- Cheap: Less expensive — simpler procedure, no mandatory legal representation
- Less formal: Not bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence
- Relief of court dockets: Take pressure off the formal court system
- Flexibility: Can develop own procedures suited to the subject matter
7.2 Articles 323A and 323B
Article 323A: Parliament may by law provide for the establishment of an Administrative Tribunal for adjudication of disputes relating to recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to public services of the Union and States. The Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 was enacted under this power — creating the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) and State Administrative Tribunals (SATs).
Article 323B: Parliament or State Legislatures may by law establish tribunals for adjudication of disputes relating to taxation, industrial and labour disputes, land reforms, elections, etc.
7.3 L. Chandra Kumar — Tribunal Subordination to High Courts
Court: Supreme Court of India — 7-Judge Constitutional Bench
Held: (1) Administrative Tribunals (created under Articles 323A and 323B) are valid and have jurisdiction over service matters. (2) However, they are subject to the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Courts under Articles 226 and 227 — the High Court’s power of judicial review cannot be excluded. (3) The Tribunals created under Articles 323A/323B cannot be the sole repositories of jurisdiction in their fields — judicial review under Article 226 must remain available. (4) Since judicial review under Articles 32 and 226 is a basic structure element, Parliament cannot, even by constitutional amendment, exclude it. (5) Decisions of all Tribunals are subject to appellate jurisdiction of High Courts — they must be treated as courts of first instance subject to HC review.
Principle: All tribunals are subject to judicial review by High Courts under Articles 226/227; judicial review is a basic structure element that cannot be removed — tribunals are courts of first instance, not courts of last resort.
Held: 5-Judge Bench referred the question of constitutionality of various tribunals (NCLT, NCLAT, etc.) to a larger bench. The Court however observed that tribunals must have technical members of sufficient calibre and independence; the appointment of technical members from the executive to judicial bodies raises concerns about independence. Tribunals cannot be staffed by persons lacking security of tenure and judicial independence.
Principle: Tribunal members must have judicial independence — executive control over appointments and service conditions compromises the independence of tribunals.
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Topic 8 — Commissions of Inquiry
Object: To enable the Central or State Government to appoint a commission to inquire into any “definite matter of public importance”.
Section 3: Central Government may appoint a Commission of Inquiry. If the matter relates exclusively to a State subject, the State Government may appoint it — but if it relates to both, only the Central Government can appoint (to avoid conflict).
Powers of Commission: Can summon and examine witnesses on oath; require production of documents; require evidence by affidavit. The commission has powers of a civil court for evidence gathering. However, it is NOT a court — it cannot determine criminal or civil liability.
Natural Justice: Since persons may be “implicated” by commission findings, they have a right to be heard before adverse findings are recorded. The SC/ST Act principles require fair procedure even in commissions.
Commission Report: Not legally binding — it is submitted to the Government which decides what action to take. No person can be punished solely on the basis of commission findings.
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Topic 9 — Regulatory Agencies
Modern governance requires specialised regulatory bodies to oversee complex sectors. In India, key regulatory agencies include:
| Regulator | Governing Law | Jurisdiction |
|---|---|---|
| SEBI (Securities and Exchange Board of India) | SEBI Act, 1992 | Securities market, stock exchanges, investor protection, insider trading |
| TRAI (Telecom Regulatory Authority of India) | TRAI Act, 1997 | Telecommunications services, tariffs, quality of service |
| IRDAI (Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority) | IRDAI Act, 1999 | Insurance companies, brokers, intermediaries |
| CCI (Competition Commission of India) | Competition Act, 2002 | Anti-competitive practices, abuse of dominance, combinations |
| RBI (Reserve Bank of India) | RBI Act, 1934; Banking Regulation Act, 1949 | Monetary policy, banking regulation, foreign exchange |
| CERC/SERCs (Electricity Regulatory Commissions) | Electricity Act, 2003 | Tariffs, grid standards, licensing in electricity sector |
- Independent from day-to-day government control (though appointees are government-approved)
- Combine legislative (rule-making), executive (enforcement), and quasi-judicial (adjudication) functions — raising separation of powers concerns
- Subject to judicial review by High Courts and the Supreme Court
- Appeals from their decisions typically go to specialised appellate tribunals (SAT for SEBI, TDSAT for TRAI, NCLAT for CCI)
- Must observe natural justice and principles of administrative law in all adjudicatory proceedings
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📝 Important Questions for Exam
A. Short Answer Questions (2–5 Marks)
B. Long Answer / Essay Questions (10–15 Marks)
C. Problem-Based Questions (with Model Answer Hints)
D. MCQ Practice (20 Questions)
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⚡ Quick Revision Summary
1. Key Principles and Cases Table
| Concept | Key Case | Principle |
|---|---|---|
| Rule of Law | Bharat Singh (1967); Ram Jawaya Kapur (1955) | Executive action prejudicing private rights must be authorised by law |
| Separation of Powers | Kesavananda Bharati (1973) | Separation of powers is basic structure; no organ can encroach on another’s essential functions |
| Delegation limits | In re Delhi Laws Act (1951) | Legislature must retain policy-making; essential legislative functions cannot be delegated |
| Laying requirement | Lachmi Narain v. UOI (1976) | Negative procedure = directory; affirmative procedure = mandatory |
| Natural justice — scope | A.K. Kraipak (1970) | NJ applies to ALL public authorities affecting rights; judicial/administrative distinction abolished |
| NJ — constitutional | Maneka Gandhi (1978) | Natural justice is part of Articles 14 and 21 — procedure must be fair, just, reasonable |
| Bias — test | General principle | Real danger test — would a fair-minded observer apprehend real danger of bias? |
| Certiorari — scope | Syed Yakoob (1964) | Supervisory only — jurisdictional errors + NJ violations + errors of law on face of record |
| Article 226 — scope | Anadi Mukta Sadguru (1989) | Wider than Art. 32 — any purpose; mandamus against private bodies with statutory duty |
| Tribunals — subordination | L. Chandra Kumar (1997) | All tribunals subject to HC judicial review — cannot be excluded; basic structure |
| Tribunal independence | Rojer Mathew (2020) | Tribunal members need judicial independence — executive control compromises them |
| RTI — constitutional basis | Preamble + Art. 19(1)(a) | Right to know implicit in free speech; RTI Act gives legislative force |
2. Golden Rules of Administrative Law
- Every act of government prejudicing a citizen’s rights must be authorised by law — Rule of Law
- Legislature must retain policy-making — delegation of legislative power is permissible but not of the essential legislative function
- Delegated legislation can be challenged as ultra vires, inconsistent with parent Act, unreasonable, or in violation of FRs
- Natural justice applies to ALL public authorities affecting rights — not just courts; A.K. Kraipak abolished the judicial/administrative distinction
- NJ is part of Articles 14 and 21 — any procedure depriving life or liberty must be fair and include hearing (Maneka Gandhi)
- Two rules of NJ: Audi alteram partem (hear both sides) + Nemo judex in causa sua (no bias)
- Test for bias = real danger test (not actual bias, not mere suspicion)
- Certiorari reviews legality — not merits; errors of fact are NOT grounds for certiorari
- Article 226 (HC) is wider than Article 32 (SC) — any legal right, not just fundamental rights
- Mandamus lies against private bodies exercising public/statutory duties (Anadi Mukta Sadguru)
- All tribunals must be subject to HC judicial review — judicial review is basic structure and cannot be excluded (L. Chandra Kumar)
- Commission of Inquiry reports are NOT binding — Government decides what action to follow
- Legitimate expectation creates a procedural right to be heard — not a substantive right to the benefit
- Proportionality: administrative action must be necessary, suitable, and not excessive — least restrictive means
LB-402: Administrative Law | LL.B. IV Term | Faculty of Law, University of Delhi | 2023. For educational purposes only.