Facts: Modi Entertainment held rights to broadcast cricket matches in India. W.S.G. Cricket sought an injunction in the UK against Modi. Modi applied to the Indian court for an anti-suit injunction preventing W.S.G. from pursuing the UK proceedings.
Held: The Supreme Court laid down the principles for granting anti-suit injunctions: (1) the defendant must be amenable to personal jurisdiction of the Indian court; (2) the injunction must be necessary to prevent inequitable conduct; (3) the foreign proceedings must be vexatious/oppressive or in breach of a valid forum selection clause; (4) the balance of convenience must favour granting the injunction.

Facts: A vessel (M.V. Elizabeth) arrested in Goa for unpaid freight. The admiralty jurisdiction of the Bombay High Court (extended to Goa) was challenged.
Held: The Supreme Court confirmed that Indian High Courts have admiralty jurisdiction (in rem) over ships found within their jurisdiction regardless of the nationality of the vessel or where the contract was made. The court can arrest the ship itself.

Facts: Narain Raja, whose family was of Nepalese origin, claimed Indian citizenship under Art. 5 of the Constitution. Kedar Pandey challenged this, contending Narain Raja’s domicile was Nepal, not India.
Issue: Had Narain Raja acquired a domicile of choice in India by the time the Constitution came into force (1950)?
Held: Yes. The Supreme Court examined extensive evidence of Narain Raja’s life in India — education in Calcutta, ownership of extensive properties in Bihar, political participation as voter and candidate, marriage in India, building of houses and Sanskrit Vidyalaya in Ramnagar — and concluded that long before 1949 he had acquired a domicile of choice in India with the requisite animus manendi.

Facts: Madhya Bharat State imposed capitation fees for medical college admission based on domicile (bona fide residents of Madhya Bharat were exempt). D.P. Joshi challenged this as violating Art. 15(1) of the Constitution (prohibition of discrimination on grounds of place of birth).
Held: The Supreme Court upheld the rule. Domicile and place of birth are legally distinct concepts. Art. 15(1) prohibits discrimination on the ground of place of birth, not domicile. Domicile means permanent home — a person’s domicile of origin is received at birth but need not be the place of birth. The exemption based on domicile is constitutionally valid.

Facts: Rosetta (wife) filed for dissolution of marriage in Calcutta. The husband, Attaullah, had been domiciled in British India but after partition resided in Pakistan (NWFP). The Divorce Act, Section 2 required the parties to be domiciled in India on the date of filing.
Held: The Calcutta High Court held that with the disappearance of British India after Partition, it was impossible for a person domiciled in British India to retain that domicile. Attaullah, whose residence and life were centred in what became Pakistan, could not have acquired an Indian domicile by mere intention without the factum of residence. The petition was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction under S.2 Divorce Act.

Facts: An Indian couple (both domiciled in India) married under Hindu rites in India. The husband went to Nevada, USA, obtained a divorce decree, remarried, and returned to India. The wife sought maintenance under S. 488 CrPC.
Held: The Supreme Court refused to recognise the Nevada divorce decree. The husband had acquired only a temporary residence in Nevada (to obtain a quick divorce — Nevada allowed 6-week residency for divorce), not a genuine domicile of choice. The Nevada court had no genuine jurisdiction based on domicile. The divorce was a sham — the parties’ domicile remained India. Under S.13 CPC, the foreign judgment was not conclusive as it was without jurisdiction.

Facts: Bills of lading for a cargo of herrings shipped from Newfoundland to New York contained an English law clause. The Hague Rules were mandatory under Newfoundland law but the bill of lading excluded them.
Held: Lord Wright held that the parties’ expressed choice of English law was valid even though the contract was made and performed in other jurisdictions. The intention of the parties shall be expressed or can be inferred from all the circumstances. The chosen law must be bona fide and legal, and not contrary to public policy.

Facts: A contract between NTPC (Indian company) and Singer (US company) for supply of equipment for a power plant. The contract contained a clause providing for arbitration in India under Indian law. A dispute arose and the question was which law governed the arbitration and the contract.
Held: The Supreme Court held that the proper law of the contract is the law chosen by the parties expressly or by necessary implication, or, in the absence of any such choice, is the law of the country with which the contract has its closest and most real connection. Since the contract was to be performed in India, arbitration was in India under Indian rules — the proper law was Indian law. The award was subject to Indian courts’ supervisory jurisdiction.

Facts: A contract for supply of foodgrain was concluded in India for delivery in India but had some connection with the UK. The governing law question arose when a dispute was brought to the court.
Held: The Supreme Court affirmed that where parties have not expressly chosen the governing law, courts look for implied choice from the circumstances — the language of the contract, the form of arbitration clause, the place of performance, and any other relevant factors. This is the “closest and most real connection” test.

Facts: Eyre, Governor of Jamaica, committed acts in Jamaica which would amount to battery and false imprisonment in England. However, the Jamaican legislature had passed an Act of Indemnity retrospectively legalising his acts. Philips sued in England.
Held: Willes J. laid down the double actionability rule for choice of law in tort: an act done in a foreign country is a tort and actionable in England if it is:
(1) actionable as a tort according to English law (lex fori) — as if the act had been done in England; AND
(2) not justifiable by the law of the country where it was done (lex loci delicti) — i.e., it must be civilly actionable or at least not excused under foreign law.

Facts: Two British servicemen were involved in a road accident in Malta. Under Maltese law, only special (pecuniary) damages were recoverable; English law also allowed general damages for pain and suffering. Chaplin sued in England.
Held: The House of Lords held that despite the double actionability rule, English law (lex fori) could apply to grant general damages. The majority recognised that the double actionability rule should be flexible — where the parties share a common domicile and the lex fori has a sufficient connection, lex fori rules can override the strict lex loci delicti.

Facts: Husband, domiciled in India, went to Missouri, USA, obtained a divorce decree after a brief residence. He remarried. The first wife filed a complaint for bigamy. The question was whether the Missouri decree should be recognised in India.
Held: The Supreme Court held that for an Indian court to recognise a foreign divorce decree, the jurisdiction of the foreign court must have been founded on one of the grounds available for Indian courts to exercise jurisdiction in matrimonial matters — domicile, residence, or other recognised connecting factors. A decree obtained from a court that exercised jurisdiction merely based on the physical presence of one party for a short period (without genuine domicile) is not conclusive. The Missouri decree was not recognised; the husband was convicted of bigamy.

Facts: An NRI husband obtained a divorce from a US court on the ground of irretrievable breakdown. The Indian wife had not appeared in those proceedings. The husband remarried in the US. The Indian wife challenged the US decree and filed for maintenance.
Held: The Supreme Court declined to recognise the US divorce decree as it violated the principles of natural justice (the wife was not heard) and was obtained without valid jurisdiction (the parties were domiciled in India). The Court called on Parliament to enact specific legislation to protect deserted Indian wives of NRIs — a recurrent concern in Indian PIL.

Facts: Matrimonial dispute between an NRI couple. The wife (Indian citizen) returned to India with the child. The US court granted custody to the father. The husband sought enforcement of the US custody order in India.
Held: The Supreme Court held that the welfare of the child is the paramount consideration, overriding foreign court orders on custody. Indian courts are not bound to enforce foreign custody orders mechanically — they must independently examine what is in the best interest of the child. The child’s ordinary residence in India gives Indian courts jurisdiction.

Facts: A social activist filed a PIL challenging inter-country adoption of Indian children by foreign nationals on the ground that it was being carried out without proper safeguards, facilitating trafficking and exploitation.
Held: The Supreme Court laid down comprehensive guidelines for inter-country adoption: preference for domestic adoption; exhaustion of Indian adoption options before foreign; vetting by licensed agencies; court approval; age and character checks; post-placement reports. Adoption of Indian children by foreign nationals must strictly comply with these guidelines to protect children from exploitation.

Facts: A matrimonial case involving recognition of a foreign court’s jurisdiction and the applicability of Section 13 CPC grounds for non-recognition of a foreign judgment on matrimonial status.
Held: The Supreme Court examined what constitutes “competent jurisdiction” for a foreign court in matrimonial matters. The foreign court must have jurisdiction under the PIL principles applicable in India — which looks at domicile of the parties, not merely their presence or nationality.

Facts: An Indo-British couple’s matrimonial dispute — the husband took the children to India contrary to a UK court’s custody order. The wife sought return of children from Indian courts. The conflict between the UK custody order and Indian custody proceedings was central.
Held: The Supreme Court laid down principles for resolution of international child abduction and custody conflicts. While Indian courts retain jurisdiction based on ordinary residence of the child, they should generally give effect to orders of courts of the child’s country of habitual residence (UK here), unless contrary to the child’s welfare. The court must balance respect for foreign orders with the welfare principle.