Background: The petitioner, Lalita Kumari (minor), filed a habeas corpus petition as her minor daughter was kidnapped. The police station initially refused to register the FIR. The case was ultimately referred to a Constitution Bench due to conflicting precedents — one line of cases holding registration mandatory; another permitting preliminary inquiry.

Held (Constitution Bench — CJI P. Sathasivam):

1. Registration of FIR is mandatory if the information discloses commission of a cognizable offence — no preliminary inquiry is permissible in such situations.
2. If information does NOT clearly disclose a cognizable offence but indicates necessity for inquiry, a preliminary inquiry may be conducted only to ascertain whether a cognizable offence is made out — NOT to verify veracity of the allegations.
3. If preliminary inquiry reveals a cognizable offence, FIR must be registered. Closure of preliminary inquiry without registration must give reasons to the informant within 1 week.
4. Categories where preliminary inquiry MAY be permitted: (a) matrimonial disputes/family disputes; (b) commercial offences; (c) medical negligence cases; (d) corruption cases; (e) cases with abnormal delay (over 3 months) in reporting.
5. Preliminary inquiry must be time-bound — generally not exceeding 15 days (modified from original 7 days by subsequent order in Crl.M.P. No. 5029 of 2014); exceptionally 6 weeks with adequate reasons.
6. All information (whether resulting in FIR or preliminary inquiry) must be recorded in the General Diary.
7. FIR is the first step to access justice for a victim; it upholds rule of law; facilitates swift investigation; reduces manipulation.

Principle: Registration of FIR is mandatory when information ex facie discloses a cognizable offence; police officers who refuse to register cognizable offence FIRs may face departmental action; burking of crime leads to lawlessness.

Held: SC issued comprehensive directions:

• Accused is entitled to a copy of FIR at an earlier stage than mandated by §207 CrPC
• Accused or family member can apply for certified copy of FIR at police station and must receive it within 24 hours
• FIRs must be uploaded on police website within 24 hours of registration (extendable to 48 hours for connectivity issues; max. 72 hours)
• Exceptions: sexual offences, insurgency/terrorism cases, POCSO offences, and other “sensitive” cases — decision not to upload must be taken by officer not below rank of DSP
• Accused can apply to SP-level officer if denied copy; committee of three officers must decide within 3 days

Principle: Right of the accused to access FIR copy is a facet of Article 21; timely access to FIR enables the accused to take steps to protect liberty; transparency in FIR registration reduces scope for police manipulation.

Held: SC reversed HC. Key holdings:

• Where a case relates to both cognizable AND non-cognizable offences, §155(4) CrPC (§181(4) BNSS) creates a legal fiction — the entire case is treated as cognizable
• Police can investigate both offences together in such a composite case without separate Magistrate’s permission for the non-cognizable component
• The police had authority to investigate §494 IPC (bigamy) as part of the cognizable case under §498-A IPC

Principle: When a case involves both cognizable and non-cognizable offences, the entire case is treated as cognizable under §155(4) CrPC/§181(4) BNSS; police can investigate all offences together.

Held: SC reversed HC. Key holdings:

• When a complaint is filed before a Magistrate and the Magistrate passes an order under §156(3) CrPC (§210(1) BNSS) directing investigation, the complaint transforms into an FIR — the police is duty-bound to register it as a case
• The power under §156(3) impliedly includes the power to direct registration of FIR, as investigation cannot begin without a registered case
• Proper direction under §156(3): “register a case treating the complaint as FIR and investigate”

Principle: §156(3)/§210(1) BNSS includes implied power to direct FIR registration; the Magistrate’s order transforming the complaint into an FIR is mandatory; without registration, investigation cannot proceed.

Held: Key holdings:

• §156(3) CrPC (§210(1) BNSS) gives Magistrate broad implied powers — to direct registration of FIR, direct investigation, AND monitor investigation
• Hierarchy of remedies for FIR refusal: (1) Approach SP under §154(3) CrPC; (2) Approach Magistrate under §156(3); (3) File complaint under §200; (4) Only as last resort approach HC under §482/Article 226
• HC should not entertain writ petitions or §482 petitions if adequate alternative remedies under §154(3) and §156(3) are available
• No one can insist that an offence be investigated by a specific agency (CBI) — only proper investigation can be demanded

Principle: §156(3)/§210(1) BNSS powers include monitoring investigation; aggrieved persons must exhaust alternative remedies (SP → Magistrate) before approaching HC; courts should not be flooded with writ petitions for non-registration of FIRs.

Held: Yes — Magistrate’s power under §156(3) is not extinguished after cognizance. Even post-cognizance, the Magistrate can direct further investigation. The court has continuous supervisory jurisdiction over investigation to ensure complete and proper investigation. This upholds Article 21’s guarantee of fair investigation, which is part of the fair trial right.

Principle: Magistrate’s power to direct further investigation under §156(3) CrPC (§210(1) BNSS) survives cognizance; courts have continuous supervisory jurisdiction over investigation to ensure complete, fair investigation as required by Article 21.

The DK Basu Guidelines (11 requirements for all arrests):

1. Police personnel making arrest must bear accurate, visible identification and name tags; particulars entered in a register
2. Police must prepare a memo of arrest at the time of arrest — attested by at least one witness (family member or respectable local person); countersigned by arrestee; containing time and date of arrest
3. Arrested person entitled to have one friend/relative informed as soon as practicable
4. Time, place of arrest and custody venue must be notified to next friend through Legal Aid Organisation within 8–12 hours if outside district
5. Arrested person must be made aware of right to have someone informed
6. Entry in diary at place of detention — disclosing name of next friend and police officials in custody
7. Arrestee, if requests, must be medically examined at time of arrest — Inspection Memo signed by both, copy to arrestee
8. Arrestee must be subjected to medical examination every 48 hours by approved doctor
9. Copies of documents including memo of arrest sent to Illaqa Magistrate
10. Arrestee may meet lawyer during interrogation (though not throughout)
11. Police control room at district and State HQs must be informed within 12 hours of arrest; displayed on notice board

Non-compliance: Renders officer liable for departmental action AND contempt of court (proceedings can be instituted in any HC having territorial jurisdiction).

Principle: Custodial violence is the antithesis of rule of law; the DK Basu guidelines operationalize the fundamental rights of arrested persons under Articles 21 and 22; compliance is mandatory for all police officers and all arrests.

Legal Issue: What constitutes “arrest” in criminal procedure? Does voluntarily appearing before a Magistrate and obtaining bail = arrest?

Held: SC held:

• Arrest requires: (a) physical touching or confining the body of the person to be arrested, OR (b) submission to custody by word or action (§46 CrPC / §44 BNSS)
• Custody and arrest are not synonymous — there can be custody without arrest, but every arrest involves custody
• When a person voluntarily appears before Magistrate and applies for bail, he does submit to judicial custody — this is a form of custody
• However, in the facts of these cases, the SC gave benefit of “mistaken impression” rather than “deliberate concealment” — both candidates were entitled to appointment

Principle: Arrest occurs when physical control is exercised or voluntarily submitted to; mere summons/appearance before Magistrate may not constitute “arrest” in the popular sense; courts must distinguish between deliberate concealment and bona fide misunderstanding in column disclosure cases.

Key Observations: SC noted that §498-A IPC had become a “tool of harassment” — arrests were routine, indiscriminate, often covering bedridden grandparents, sisters living abroad. Data: 1,97,762 arrested in 2012; nearly 1/4 were women. Yet conviction rate was only 15%, while charge-sheeting rate was 93.6%.

Guidelines issued by SC:

• No arrest should be made merely because the offence is non-bailable and cognizable
• Police officer must be satisfied that the arrest is necessary — considering §41(1) CrPC (§35(1) BNSS) and §41A CrPC (§38 BNSS) provisions
• For offences punishable with imprisonment up to 7 years: police officer must record reasons why arrest is necessary per §41(1)(b) CrPC
• Magistrate must apply his mind before authorizing detention under §167 CrPC (§187 BNSS) — magistrates shall not sign remand orders as a matter of course
• Magistrates may be liable for contempt if they sign remand orders without recording reasons
• Notice under §41A CrPC (§38 BNSS) must be issued before arrest in cases where arrest is not immediately necessary

Principle: Arrest is not a must in all cognizable offences; arrest should be necessity-based, not mechanical; police must record reasons for arrest; magistrates must apply mind when authorizing detention; §41A CrPC/§38 BNSS notice as alternative to arrest.

Held: SC laid down foundational principles on bail in non-bailable offences:

• Bail is the rule, jail is the exception — personal liberty is precious
• For non-bailable offences, the main considerations are: (a) gravity of charge; (b) character of evidence; (c) risk of accused absconding; (d) likelihood of offence being repeated; (e) opportunity to commit further offence; (f) prejudice to proper investigation
• The court must weigh these factors and exercise judicial discretion — not fetter discretion by rigid rules

Principle: Bail is the rule; refusal to bail is the exception requiring justification; judicial discretion must be exercised based on specific factors related to the accused and the offence.

Held: SC held:

• The purpose of bail/surety is to secure the presence of the accused at trial — not to punish him before conviction
• Courts must not impose onerous suretyship conditions that a poor accused cannot meet in a bailable offence — this effectively denies bail to the poor
• Bail conditions must be reasonable and not designed to keep the accused in jail
• The concept of bail is rooted in personal liberty guaranteed by Article 21

Principle: Bail conditions must be reasonable and not designed to keep the accused in jail; suretyship conditions must not effectively deny bail to the economically weak; liberty is not a privilege of the rich.

Held: SC distinguished between the nature of bail at different stages:

• Pre-cognizance: Bail under §436A/167 CrPC (§187/479 BNSS) — Magistrate’s discretion under police custody/remand
• Post-cognizance/pre-trial: Bail under §437/438 CrPC — Sessions Court and HC’s power
• Grant of bail: courts must consider character of accusation, strength of evidence, gravity of offence, past conduct, socioeconomic background
• Cancellation of bail can be done: (a) on grounds present at time of grant (misrepresentation, suppression); (b) on supervening grounds (tampering with evidence, threatening witnesses, absconding, committing new offence)

Principle: Bail may be cancelled on both grounds existing at time of grant (misrepresentation) and supervening grounds (new mischief); courts at different levels have different powers to grant and cancel bail; jurisdiction for bail clarified.

Held: SC granted bail subject to conditions:

• Bail pending trial is the rule and jail is the exception even in serious cases
• Pre-trial detention is not meant to be punitive — accused is presumed innocent
• Factors to consider for bail: (a) seriousness of offence; (b) evidence against accused; (c) possibility of accused fleeing; (d) likelihood of interfering with witnesses; (e) danger to complainant; (f) health, age, other relevant circumstances
• Economic offences alone don’t automatically disentitle to bail — each case must be examined on own facts
• Extended pre-trial detention without conviction raises serious Article 21 concerns

Principle: Even in serious economic offences, bail remains the rule; extended pre-trial detention violates Article 21; bail conditions can be imposed to address flight risk and witness-tampering concerns without outright denial.

Held: Constitution Bench laid down comprehensive law on anticipatory bail:

1. §438 is not hedged in with restrictions — the legislative intent was to give wide powers to grant anticipatory bail
2. Court must not read into §438 limitations that are not there
3. Anticipatory bail is not to be limited only to cases of imminent arrest — the apprehension itself must be reasonable
4. Courts should not impose blanket conditions like “cooperate with investigation” without specifying what cooperation means
5. Anticipatory bail is not to be granted as a matter of course — court must consider the nature and gravity of the accusation
6. Courts are not obliged to first issue notice to the accused when hearing anticipatory bail applications (unlike regular bail)

Principle: Anticipatory bail provisions must be liberally construed; the court has wide discretion not restricted to specific situations; but it is not to be granted as a matter of course — nature of accusation, gravity, and likelihood of misuse of liberty must be considered.

Held:

• Anticipatory bail need NOT be limited to a fixed time period — it can remain operational until conclusion of trial if the court does not limit it
• However, it is open to the court to limit duration in appropriate cases if the facts warrant it
• Anticipatory bail does NOT automatically merge/end when accused appears before Magistrate on arrest
• Anticipatory bail continues to operate even after charge sheet is filed, unless the court cancels it
• Narrow view taken in earlier cases (anticipatory bail ends on first remand) overruled

Principle: Anticipatory bail can be granted for the full duration of trial; it does not automatically end on arrest or appearance before Magistrate; courts have discretion to limit duration but need not do so as a matter of course.

Held: SC laid down that bail once granted can be cancelled on “supervening circumstances” even if those circumstances were not present when bail was granted:

• Bail can be cancelled when: (a) the accused misuses liberty during bail; (b) the accused attempts to flee justice; (c) the accused attempts to tamper with evidence or influence witnesses; (d) the accused commits fresh offences during bail
• The court granting bail can cancel it; so can any superior court on application
• Cancellation is not limited to grounds that existed at time of grant

Principle: Bail can be cancelled on supervening grounds even if bail was validly granted; misuse of bail, witness tampering, fleeing, and committing fresh offences are grounds for cancellation; bail is not irrevocable.

Held: SC held:

• House arrest under judicial supervision constitutes custody — it is not the same as being free
• House arrest can be a valid interim measure for certain categories of accused (serious illness, age, risk to health) pending bail hearing
• The humanitarian dimensions of bail — health, age, family obligations — must be weighed alongside security concerns
• Court has inherent powers to fashion appropriate custodial arrangements during pendency of bail applications

Principle: House arrest under judicial supervision constitutes a valid form of custody; courts have power to craft intermediate measures between full bail and jail; humanitarian factors are relevant to bail decisions.

Held: SC laid down principles on framing of charges:

• At the charge-framing stage, the court is not to conduct a mini-trial
• The test is whether there is a “prima facie case” — whether there is sufficient ground to presume that the accused may have committed the offence
• The court must assume that the prosecution’s version of facts is true at this stage
• Charge should be framed if there is a reasonable suspicion — not proof beyond reasonable doubt
• Elaborate weighing of evidence is impermissible at charge-framing stage

Principle: At charge-framing stage, court considers whether prima facie case exists — not whether the accused is guilty; the test is “reasonable suspicion” not “proof beyond reasonable doubt”; courts must not conduct mini-trials at this stage.

Held: SC reiterated:

• At the stage of framing charge/discharge, the court must sift through the material only to find whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused
• The court should not weigh the evidence meticulously — only a strong suspicion is needed
• If evidence is such that it would be a travesty of justice to allow the accused to proceed to trial, discharge is appropriate; otherwise, charge must be framed
• Discharge by Sessions Court reviewed by HC — HC must apply the same test of prima facie satisfaction

Principle: Discharge is warranted only when the prosecution material does not make out any prima facie case — when allowing the accused to stand trial would itself be a travesty of justice; courts must not pre-judge guilt at the charge-framing stage.

Held: The power of the Public Prosecutor to withdraw prosecution under §321 CrPC (§360 BNSS) is subject to judicial scrutiny:

• The Prosecutor must have independent application of mind — not withdraw at the direction of the government without independent opinion
• The court must apply its own mind — withdrawal cannot be granted if it would be contrary to public interest
• Political interference in withdrawal decisions (to protect political allies) is impermissible
• Reasons must be recorded for consenting to withdrawal
• Withdrawal in non-compoundable offences requires clear justification in public interest

Principle: Withdrawal from prosecution requires both the PP’s independent assessment and the court’s independent consent; courts must ensure withdrawal is in public interest, not for extraneous political reasons.

Held: SC directed the Union and States to implement the Witness Protection Scheme 2018 (now given statutory backing under §398 BNSS). Key features:

• Categorization of witnesses: Category A (threat to life), B (threat of grievous hurt), C (threat to reputation/property)
• Competent authority to assess threats and grant protection
• Protection measures: safe houses, change of identity, police protection, in-camera testimony, screen/disguise
• Protection continues even after giving testimony if threat persists

Principle: Witness protection is essential for fair trial and truth-finding; SC directed a comprehensive nationwide scheme; now given statutory backing under BNSS.

Held: SC (Dharmadhikari J.) held:

• Fair trial is a fundamental right under Article 21 — includes the right to an impartial judge, an independent judiciary, and the right of the accused to be represented
• Fair trial includes fair investigation — where investigation is biased, flawed, or incomplete, the right to fair trial is violated
• The right to fair trial extends to the victim as well — the victim’s right to see justice done is also part of fair trial
• When witness turns hostile due to fear or inducement, the court must examine the circumstances and take appropriate measures
• The State has a duty to ensure witnesses are protected and not intimidated
• SC ordered retrial in Gujarat High Court

Principle: Fair trial is a fundamental right under Article 21; it extends to victims as well as accused; biased investigation violates fair trial rights; the court has power to order retrial where fair trial has been denied; witness protection is a prerequisite for fair trial.

Held: SC held:

• Speedy trial is a fundamental right under Article 21
• Prolonged pre-trial detention without adequate legal representation violates Articles 21 and 22
• The accused must be provided legal aid under Article 39A if they cannot afford representation
• If trial cannot be expeditiously conducted, the accused must be released on bail
• The state must ensure that undertrial prisoners are not kept in jail indefinitely for want of trial

Principle: Speedy trial is a fundamental right; prolonged undertrial imprisonment without conviction violates Article 21; the state must provide legal aid; if trial cannot proceed expeditiously, bail must be granted.

Held: SC upheld the conviction and death sentence but also laid down important principles:

• Even a terrorist accused of heinous crimes has the right to fair trial under Article 21
• The right to legal representation (including appointing a lawyer for an accused who refuses one) is non-derogable
• The court must ensure the accused understands the charges — rights under Articles 20 and 22 must be scrupulously protected
• In camera proceedings for security-sensitive parts of trial are permissible but must be minimal

Principle: Even accused of the most heinous crimes are entitled to fair trial; the right to legal representation is non-derogable; courts must ensure procedural safeguards are observed even in terrorism trials.

Held: Constitution Bench held:

• §319 CrPC (corresponding to BNSS provisions on summoning additional accused) is not confined to any specific stage of trial — can be exercised at any point after court takes cognizance
• The standard for summoning is “appears to be guilty” — a higher threshold than “prima facie case” but lower than “proof beyond reasonable doubt”
• “Appears to be guilty” means the court must be satisfied on the evidence that the person has committed the offence — based on evidence recorded at trial, not just suspicion
• This power is a consequential power arising from the evidence placed before the court during trial

Principle: Courts can summon additional accused at any stage of trial; the standard is “appears to be guilty” based on evidence adduced — a higher threshold than prima facie case; this power ensures all persons who appear guilty based on trial evidence are brought to account.

Held: SC held:

• Dignity of the individual is an inviolable constitutional right under Articles 14, 19, 21
• Custodial torture, inhuman treatment, and denial of legal aid during investigation violate Article 21
• NHRC guidelines and DK Basu requirements must be strictly followed
• Court awarded compensation to the petitioner for violation of his fundamental rights during custody
• Police officers who engage in custodial violence/torture must be proceeded against

Principle: Human dignity and fundamental rights are non-derogable even during investigation; custodial torture/inhumane treatment violates Article 21; courts can award compensation for fundamental rights violations; officers engaged in custodial violence must be prosecuted.

Held: SC held that the hearing on sentence under §235(2) CrPC (§269 BNSS) is mandatory and meaningful — not a formality:

• The accused must be given a real and effective opportunity to place all mitigating factors before the court
• The court must consider all mitigating factors before deciding between death penalty and life imprisonment (the “rarest of rare” test)
• A cursory or nominal hearing on sentence violates Article 21 — particularly when the ultimate punishment of death is being considered
• Courts must give the accused adequate time to place materials before the court on the question of sentence

Principle: Pre-sentence hearing is a mandatory, meaningful opportunity — not a formality; courts must genuinely consider all mitigating factors before imposing capital punishment; violation of §235(2)/§269 BNSS hearing is a ground for setting aside sentence.

Held: SC laid down comprehensive law on quashing of criminal proceedings under §482 CrPC (§528 BNSS — inherent powers of HC):

• Offences can be classified as: (a) offences against individuals (that may be quashed if parties compromise); (b) offences against society/State (that cannot be quashed even if parties compromise)
• For private offences (assault, cheating, defamation), if parties genuinely compromise, HC may quash even if offence is non-compoundable
• For serious violent offences (murder, rape, dacoity, robbery) or offences affecting societal public interest, compromise between parties cannot be ground for quashing
• Courts must examine: (a) nature of offence; (b) whether it is purely private; (c) whether the continuation of prosecution would serve any purpose; (d) whether the settlement is genuine and not under duress

Principle: HC can quash criminal proceedings under §482 CrPC/§528 BNSS even for non-compoundable offences when parties compromise, provided the offence is private in nature; offences against society cannot be quashed merely on compromise; courts must examine genuineness of settlement.

Held: SC reiterated principles from Gian Singh:

• Quashing criminal proceedings for serious offences (involving elements of violence, coercion, or public interest) is impermissible even if parties settle
• Courts must not substitute their sense of justice for the statutory scheme of compounding — offences not on the compoundable list were kept there for a reason
• Kidnapping/abduction is an offence that has societal impact — cannot be quashed on private settlement

Principle: Not all criminal proceedings can be quashed on the basis of settlement; for serious offences (kidnapping, violent crimes) with societal impact, quashing on private compromise is not permissible.

• The allegations in the FIR, even if taken at face value, do not disclose a cognizable offence
• The proceedings are manifestly frivolous or vexatious
• Parties have reached a genuine compromise in private offences
• Continuation of proceedings would cause injustice or oppression

Inherent powers cannot be used to: (a) stifle legitimate prosecution; (b) quash serious offences merely on settlement; (c) substitute the court’s view for the investigating agency’s view at the FIR stage.

• Appeal against acquittal is maintainable but courts must exercise caution — double presumption of innocence (the accused was innocent before trial; the trial court found him innocent)
• HC can set aside acquittal if the trial court’s view is “perverse” or “unreasonable” in light of evidence
• Merely because HC takes a different view does not mean acquittal should be set aside — for every two views, the benefit goes to the accused

Held: SC laid down comprehensive framework (building on Gian Singh):

1. §482 CrPC/§528 BNSS power is not unlimited — it must be exercised to secure the ends of justice or prevent abuse of process
2. The categories where FIR/criminal proceedings can be quashed include: (a) when allegations do not constitute an offence; (b) when allegations are absurd and inherently improbable; (c) where the FIR does not disclose a cognizable offence; (d) where criminal proceedings are manifestly attended with mala fide or motivated by ulterior purpose; (e) where the complaint is time-barred
3. At the stage of §482, the court does NOT conduct a trial — it only sees if the allegations, taken at face value, disclose a criminal offence
4. Where parties have settled in a purely civil/private dispute (matrimonial cases, commercial disputes), the HC may quash even if the offence is non-compoundable — but not for serious violent offences
5. The paramount consideration is whether the ends of justice require quashing

Principle: Comprehensive framework for HC’s inherent powers to quash FIRs and criminal proceedings; the power is discretionary, exercised to prevent abuse; at §482/§528 stage, the court takes the prosecution’s case at face value; serious offences with public interest cannot be quashed on settlement.