Facts: A zinc and lead smelter in Trail, British Columbia (Canada) emitted sulphur dioxide fumes that crossed the border and damaged agricultural lands and properties in the State of Washington (USA). The US sought compensation and cessation of the damage.

Held: (a) Canada was responsible for the damage caused to the US by the Trail Smelter; (b) The principle was established that no state has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another state; (c) Canada was ordered to pay compensation and the smelter was directed to comply with an operational regime to minimize future damage.

Principle: Trail Smelter is the foundational case of international environmental liability. It established the principle of transboundary harm — a state is responsible under international law for environmental damage caused by activities in its territory to the environment of another state. This is now codified in Stockholm Principle 21 and Rio Principle 2.

Facts: A 1977 treaty between Hungary and Czechoslovakia (now Slovakia) provided for the construction of a dam system on the Danube River. Hungary suspended and eventually abandoned the project citing environmental concerns. Slovakia proceeded with a unilateral variant of the project. Hungary terminated the treaty.

Held: (a) Hungary was not justified in suspending and abandoning the project — it could not terminate a treaty based on environmental necessity alone; (b) Slovakia’s unilateral diversion of the Danube was a wrongful act; (c) Justice Weeramantry’s Separate Opinion is the most celebrated for environmental law: he recognised sustainable development as a principle of international law and argued that the concept of sustainable development — reconciling development and environmental protection — is now part of customary international law.

Principle: Weeramantry J’s separate opinion is the key part for environmental law — it is the most thorough judicial elaboration of sustainable development as a norm of international law. Sustainable development requires balancing the needs of development against the protection of the environment for present and future generations.

Facts: Uruguay authorized the construction of pulp mills on the River Uruguay, a shared watercourse governed by the 1975 Statute of the River Uruguay (bilateral treaty with Argentina). Argentina claimed the mills would cause transboundary pollution and that Uruguay had not complied with procedural obligations under the Statute.

Held: (a) Uruguay had breached some procedural obligations (notification and consultation) under the 1975 Statute; (b) Uruguay had not violated the substantive obligation to prevent transboundary harm (no significant damage to the Argentine side was proved); (c) The Court affirmed the obligation of states to conduct an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) before undertaking activities that may have significant adverse effects on a shared resource.

Principle: The obligation to conduct an EIA before transboundary harm-causing activities is a requirement of general international law — not just treaty obligation. States must monitor activities throughout their continuance. This is one of the most important ICJ pronouncements on the procedural dimensions of international environmental law.

Facts: Nicaragua excavated a canal and established a military presence in a disputed border area, causing damage to Costa Rica’s territory including a forest and wetland. ICJ had earlier ruled that Nicaragua had to remove its forces. Question: What compensation was owed?

Held: Nicaragua was required to pay compensation for environmental damage — including for harm to ecosystems, loss of environmental goods and services, and restoration costs. The Court assessed compensation for: (1) environmental damage per se (degraded ecosystem services); (2) expenses of restoration; (3) costs of studies and monitoring. First ICJ case to award compensation for purely environmental damage (damage to environment in itself, not mediated through harm to persons or property).

Principle: A state can be ordered to pay compensation for environmental damage per se — for harm to the environment itself, including ecosystem services. This is a landmark development in establishing the intrinsic value of the environment in international law.

Facts: Industries (H series chemical industries) in Bichhri village, Rajasthan discharged untreated, highly toxic effluent (including oleum and iron-based sludge) causing severe environmental damage — making land uncultivable, water sources contaminated, and causing health damage to villagers. Industries were operating without consent and in violation of environmental laws.

Held: (1) Polluter Pays Principle recognized: “Once the activity carried on is hazardous or inherently dangerous, the person carrying on such activity is liable to make good the loss caused to any other person by his activity irrespective of whether he took reasonable care.” (2) Industries ordered to remediate the environment — clean up the sludge and restore the land; pay compensation. (3) Costs of remediation are part of the Polluter Pays Principle — absolute liability for harm to the environment extends not just to victim compensation but also to ecological restoration. (4) Rule confirmed in the 2011 follow-up case — industries still not complied; contempt proceedings; ordered to pay further compensation.

Principle: Polluter Pays Principle recognized as part of Indian law. Industries absolutely liable for environmental damage — must pay compensation to victims AND bear costs of environmental restoration. Absolute liability (no exceptions for due care) applies to hazardous activities.

Facts: Tanneries in Tamil Nadu discharging untreated effluents containing toxic chemicals into agricultural fields, waterways, and River Palar — making water undrinkable, land infertile. Nearly 35,000 hectares of agricultural land became partially or totally unfit for cultivation. 350 of 467 wells in surveyed villages were polluted.

Held: (1) The traditional concept that development and ecology are opposed is no longer acceptable — “Sustainable Development” is the answer. (2) Precautionary Principle and Polluter Pays Principle are essential features of Sustainable Development and are part of Indian law. (3) The three dimensions of the Precautionary Principle (as outlined above) are affirmed. (4) Industries directed to pay compensation to affected farmers and villagers; directed to establish effluent treatment plants; non-complying industries to be closed.

Principle: Landmark case incorporating sustainable development, precautionary principle, and polluter pays principle into Indian domestic law as part of customary international law. These principles are now part of the “law of the land” under Art.21.

Facts: Challenge to the construction of the Sardar Sarovar Dam on the River Narmada, which would displace hundreds of thousands of tribal people and submerge large tracts of forest and agricultural land. Petitioners challenged the height of the dam and the displacement and rehabilitation process.

Held: (1) The Court upheld the construction of the dam — development projects may displace people but this is constitutionally permissible provided rehabilitation is proper. (2) The Precautionary Principle does not mean NO development — it means development must be accompanied by scientific evaluation and adequate safeguards. (3) Decision on development-environment trade-off: The Court held that where development is necessary for greater public good, environment concerns must be balanced — sustainable development requires the balancing of the two. (4) The NBA had already agreed to the project at the height of 88 metres — challenge at higher heights not maintainable. (5) Rehabilitation of displaced persons is a constitutional obligation; dam to be raised only as rehabilitation progresses.

Principle: Development and environment are not necessarily opposed; the precautionary principle does not mean no development. Displacement for large projects is constitutionally permissible if accompanied by proper rehabilitation. The Court engaged in a detailed balancing of sustainable development.

Facts: Public tanks (bodies of water) in Tirupathi were being converted into building sites. These tanks were traditionally maintained for water supply and local ecology.

Held: The Public Trust Doctrine was applied to prevent the government from alienating public tanks to private parties. Natural resources like tanks that are meant for public use cannot be given away to private parties. The government’s role as trustee of natural resources means it cannot act contrary to the public interest in these resources.

Principle: Public Trust Doctrine applied to prevent conversion of public water bodies for private development. Government is trustee of natural resources; cannot alienate them contrary to public interest.

Facts: A businessman filed a PIL under Art. 32 ostensibly to stop discharge of colliery sludge into the Bokaro River. However, the Court found on examination of the record that the petitioner’s primary motive was personal — he had a commercial dispute with TISCO about slurry collection rights; he was using PIL as a weapon to pressurize them.

Held: (1) Right to life under Art.21 includes right to enjoyment of pollution-free water and air. (2) A petition under Art. 32 for the prevention of pollution is maintainable at the instance of affected persons or even by a group of social workers or journalists. (3) However, PIL cannot be used for personal grudge or enmity — recourse to Art. 32 must be by a person genuinely interested in protection of society on behalf of the community, not for personal benefit. (4) This petition dismissed as it was filed not in public interest but personal interest; costs imposed.

Principle: Art.21 includes right to pollution-free water and air. PIL for environmental protection is maintainable, but the petitioner must have genuine public interest — not personal motive. Courts will scrutinize the bona fides of the petitioner.

Facts: The first PIL case dealing with the environment in India. An organization wrote a letter to the Supreme Court about illegal limestone quarrying in the Mussoorie hill range causing severe ecological damage — landslides, deforestation, disruption of water sources, and threat to the ecologically sensitive Doon Valley.

Held: (1) The letter was treated as a writ petition — the Court exercised its epistolary jurisdiction. (2) The Court appointed expert committees to investigate. (3) Several limestone quarries were ordered to be closed even though they were operating legally — the broader environmental interest overrode individual commercial rights. (4) The Court recognized that protection of the environment is a constitutional obligation and that legal mining operations can be stopped if they cause severe ecological damage. (5) India’s first significant environmental PIL — pioneered the use of Art.32 for environmental protection.

Principle: Courts can exercise epistolary jurisdiction in environmental matters. Even legally operating industries can be shut if they cause severe ecological damage. Environmental protection is a constitutional obligation. First landmark environmental PIL in India.

Facts: The government had leased forestland on the banks of the River Beas (ecologically sensitive area in Himachal Pradesh) to a private company (Span Motels) owned by the family of Union Minister Kamal Nath. The motel diverted the course of the river and felled trees. A public notice in a newspaper magazine led to the PIL.

Held: (1) Public Trust Doctrine adopted in India — the state is the trustee of natural resources like rivers, forests, air, and seashores; these are held in trust for public use. (2) The government acted contrary to its duties as trustee by leasing ecologically sensitive land to a private company. (3) The lease was cancelled. (4) “Exemplary damages” were imposed — it is a case of restitution of environment for public purpose. (5) The motel was directed to pay compensation for the environmental damage caused by its activities (restoring the river and replanting trees).

Principle: The Public Trust Doctrine is part of Indian law. Natural resources — rivers, forests, shores, air — are held in public trust; the state cannot alienate them contrary to public interest. Any private party that damages such resources must restore and compensate. Exemplary damages can be imposed for environmental damage.

Facts: Long-running PIL on vehicular pollution in Delhi. Delhi’s air quality was severely deteriorating due to vehicular emissions, especially from buses, autos, and commercial vehicles running on diesel.

Held: The Supreme Court issued a series of directions over the years, culminating in one of the most dramatic environmental orders in India: (1) All commercial vehicles (buses, autos, taxis) in Delhi must convert to Compressed Natural Gas (CNG) by a specified date; (2) Old, polluting vehicles to be phased out; (3) Lead-free petrol to be used; (4) Emission standards to be strictly enforced. The Court appointed the Bhure Lal Committee (Environment Pollution Prevention and Control Authority — EPCA) to monitor compliance. This case is credited with dramatically improving Delhi’s air quality in the early 2000s.

Principle: Courts can issue detailed mandatory directions for environmental protection under Art.32 and 21. The right to breathe clean air is part of Art.21. Judicial monitoring through expert committees is a legitimate tool.

Facts: A private company was given a site in Calcutta for constructing a five-star hotel by the Zoological Society — the site was adjacent to the Alipore Zoo. The challenge was that the construction would harm the animals in the Zoo.

Held: The Supreme Court held that Art. 48-A (DPSP) and Art. 51-A(g) (Fundamental Duty) must inform the interpretation of Art.21. Courts, when called upon to decide environmental disputes, must have regard to Art. 48-A and 51-A(g). The Court outlined criteria for granting or refusing permission for development near ecologically sensitive areas. The five-star hotel was allowed with conditions to minimize harm to the zoo animals.

Principle: Art. 48-A and 51-A(g) are constitutionally significant in environmental cases and must inform judicial approach. Courts must balance development needs against environmental considerations in each case.

Facts: A long-running PIL filed by advocate M.C. Mehta directing various industries and municipalities to stop discharging untreated effluents into the River Ganga. Tanneries in Kanpur were the main focus.

Held: (1) Tanneries discharging toxic effluents into the Ganga without treatment facilities ordered to be closed until they established primary effluent treatment plants. (2) The Water Act requirements (consent, effluent standards) were strictly enforced. (3) The Court held that the financial capacity of the tanneries to set up treatment plants was irrelevant — they had no right to operate if they were polluting the river. (4) National River Conservation Programme directed.

Principle: Industries cannot claim a right to operate if they are discharging untreated effluents into rivers. Financial inability is not a defense to environmental violation. Strict enforcement of consent requirements under the Water Act.

Facts: Residents of Ratlam Municipality complained that the municipality was failing to maintain drainage, construct latrines, and remove filth — causing a public nuisance and health hazard. The municipality pleaded shortage of funds.

Held: (1) A Municipal Council has a statutory duty to remove public nuisances and maintain basic sanitation; financial stringency is not a defense to a statutory obligation. (2) A magistrate under S.133 CrPC can order a municipality to perform its statutory functions for removing public nuisances. (3) This case established that citizens can enforce environmental statutory duties of local bodies through courts. (4) People’s collective fundamental right to a clean environment is recognized.

Principle: Statutory environmental duties of public bodies are enforceable by courts; financial inability is not a defense. Foundational case for using S.133 CrPC to enforce environmental duties. Citizens can approach courts to compel local bodies to perform their statutory environmental obligations.

Facts: A church was using loudspeakers for religious prayers and services, causing noise disturbance to residents of a neighbouring colony. The residents complained of noise pollution.

Held: (1) No religion prescribes or preaches the use of loudspeakers or amplifiers as an essential religious practice. (2) The right to practice religion under Art. 25 does not extend to using loudspeakers or creating noise that disturbs others. (3) Noise pollution is an infringement of Art. 21 (right to a peaceful environment). (4) The noise standards under the Noise Pollution Rules and the Air Act must be strictly adhered to, regardless of the source (religious or otherwise). Church’s use of loudspeakers restrained.

Principle: No fundamental right to use loudspeakers for religious activities. Noise pollution infringes Art. 21. Noise standards are applicable to all — including religious institutions. Right to religion does not override right to a peaceful environment.

Facts: Shriram Foods and Fertilizers Industries (part of Delhi Cloth Mills group) operated a caustic chlorine plant in densely populated Delhi. In December 1985, oleum gas leaked from one of the plants, killing one person and injuring many others. A second leak occurred days later. M.C. Mehta filed a PIL seeking compensation and the question of liability of enterprises engaged in hazardous or inherently dangerous industries arose.

Constitutional Bench Held: The Supreme Court (P.N. Bhagwati, CJ) laid down the doctrine of Absolute Liability — departing from and going beyond the English rule of Strict Liability (Rylands v. Fletcher, 1868).

Principle: India’s absolute liability rule goes BEYOND Rylands v. Fletcher — there are NO exceptions whatsoever. Any enterprise engaged in a hazardous activity is absolutely liable for all harm arising from that activity — regardless of fault and regardless of any precautions taken. This is a uniquely Indian contribution to tort law.

Facts: On the night of December 2-3, 1984, methyl isocyanate (MIC) gas leaked from the Union Carbide plant in Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh — the worst industrial disaster in history. Over 15,000 people died immediately and hundreds of thousands were injured, with long-term health effects. The Union of India filed suit in a US Court; Union Carbide filed for transfer to India. The Indian Parliament enacted the Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster (Processing of Claims) Act 1985 giving the Union of India exclusive power to represent claimants.

Settlement (1989): The Supreme Court facilitated a settlement of $470 million — quashing all civil and criminal proceedings against Union Carbide Corporation.

Reopening and Curative Petition: The criminal proceedings were reopened by a curative petition — the Court had erred in quashing criminal proceedings against Union Carbide. Warren Anderson (CEO) was declared an absconder. Indian companies (UCIL) and their officials were convicted by the Bhopal trial court in 2010 — widely criticized as inadequate (only 2 years imprisonment and token fines).

Key Legal Issues:

• State as parens patriae to represent disaster victims
• Absolute liability of hazardous industries (though settlement was not based on it)
• Adequacy of compensation — much debated
• Criminal accountability of multinational corporations
• Extradition of foreign accused

Principle: The Bhopal case demonstrated the need for: (a) absolute liability for hazardous industries; (b) mandatory insurance (Public Liability Insurance Act 1991 enacted); (c) better regulatory oversight; (d) effective criminal accountability for industrial disasters. The inadequacy of the compensation and criminal accountability continues to be criticized.

Held: The Supreme Court clarified that the NGT has wide powers to adjudicate environmental disputes and award compensation. The NGT’s jurisdiction is not limited only to cases arising from the seven Acts listed — it can also address substantive environmental questions that arise in the implementation of those Acts. The NGT is a specialized body with expert members and should be preferred over regular civil courts for environmental disputes.

Facts: A bauxite mining project in the Niyamgiri Hills (Odisha) was challenged by the Dongria Kondh tribe who had cultural and spiritual connection to the hills. Forest clearance was sought for mining. The Forest Rights Act 2006 recognizes tribal rights.

Held: The Supreme Court directed that gram sabhas (village assemblies) of the affected tribal villages must decide whether the bauxite mining can proceed — recognizing the rights of forest-dwelling tribal communities to decide development on their traditional lands. This was a landmark recognition of the rights of forest dwellers under the Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006. The gram sabhas voted against mining; the project was abandoned.

Principle: Forest-dwelling tribals have rights over their traditional lands under the Forest Rights Act 2006. Development projects on forest land inhabited by tribals require the free, prior, and informed consent of the affected community through gram sabhas.