Bennett Coleman & Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1973 SC 106 (Supreme Court)

Facts: The Government imposed the Newsprint Policy which limited the number of pages of newspapers and restricted the number of editions. Newspaper establishments challenged this as unconstitutional.

Issue: Whether restrictions on newsprint allocation and page limits violated Art. 19(1)(a).

Held: The Supreme Court struck down the policy. The right under Art. 19(1)(a) includes the right to circulate, and curtailing the pages of a newspaper directly curtails its circulation and thereby abridges the freedom of the press. The reduction in pages was held to be violative of Art. 19(1)(a) as it did not fall under any permissible ground in Art. 19(2).

Principle: Freedom of the press includes the right to determine the volume and content of publication. Any restriction on pagination is a direct restriction on freedom of expression.

ABP Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, (2014) 3 SCC 327 (Supreme Court)

Facts: Newspaper management challenged the Working Journalists Act 1955, contending that Wage Boards for journalists were unconstitutional as they infringed Art. 14, 19(1)(a), and 19(1)(g), and that the Act had become obsolete due to changes in the media landscape.

Issue: Constitutional validity of the Working Journalists Act 1955 and Majithia Wage Board recommendations.

Held: The Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of the Act. The Court reiterated that the Act is a welfare legislation benefiting working journalists, and its indirect impact on press freedom does not render it unconstitutional. The working journalists, as the “vocal organs” of press freedom, can be separately classified for protective legislation without violating Art. 14.

Principle: Legislation for amelioration of journalists’ conditions of service, while indirectly affecting the press, does not abridge the freedom of speech and expression under Art. 19(1)(a) unless its direct or inevitable effect is to curtail such freedom.

Prabha Dutt v. Union of India, 1982 SCR (1) 1184 (Supreme Court)

Facts: A journalist sought the right to interview death-row convicts (Billa and Ranga) in Tihar Jail. The jail authorities denied access.

Issue: Whether a journalist has a fundamental right to interview prisoners.

Held: The Supreme Court held that there is no absolute right to interview prisoners but recognized that the press has a right to gather news. The Court directed that reasonable access be given to the journalist, subject to the prisoner’s consent and security considerations.

Principle: Freedom of the press implies a right to gather news, but this right is not absolute and can be reasonably regulated in the interests of security and order.

Secy., Ministry of Broadcasting v. Cricket Association of Bengal, (1995) 2 SCC 161 (Supreme Court — Constitution Bench)

Facts: The Cricket Association of Bengal entered into an agreement with a private broadcaster (Trans World International) to exclusively broadcast cricket matches from India. The Government claimed that only Doordarshan had the right to broadcast from India.

Issue: Whether the State has a monopoly over airwaves; whether private parties can broadcast; whether the right to broadcast is part of Art. 19(1)(a).

Held: The Supreme Court held that airwaves are a public property and their use is a fundamental right under Art. 19(1)(a). The State has no monopoly over broadcasting. The Government must not only allow others to use the airwaves but must ensure that such use promotes plurality and diversity of views. An independent regulatory authority for broadcasting must be established.

Principle: The right to broadcast using airwaves is part of freedom of speech and expression. Airwaves being limited public resources must be regulated in the public interest, not monopolized by the State.

Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1 (Supreme Court — Constitution Bench)

Facts: Section 66A of the IT Act, 2000 criminalised sending “offensive” or “menacing” messages online. Several persons were arrested under this provision for Facebook posts and online expression.

Issue: Whether Section 66A is constitutional; whether it imposes unreasonable restrictions on freedom of speech and expression.

Held: The Supreme Court struck down Section 66A in its entirety as unconstitutional. The terms “offensive,” “menacing,” “grossly offensive” were held to be vague, overbroad, and incapable of precise definition, leaving scope for arbitrary exercise of power. The provision did not fall within any of the permissible grounds under Art. 19(2). The distinction between “discussion/advocacy” (protected) and “incitement” (unprotected) was emphasised — mere discussion or advocacy of a cause, even unpopular ones, is protected speech.

Principle: A penal provision that creates a chilling effect on free speech by using vague and overbroad language is unconstitutional. Only incitement (likelihood of imminent unlawful action) can be penalised, not mere discussion or advocacy.

Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1 (Supreme Court — 9-Judge Bench)

Facts: Challenges were raised to the Aadhaar biometric identity system on grounds that it violated the right to privacy. A preliminary question was whether privacy is a fundamental right.

Issue: Is the right to privacy a fundamental right under the Constitution?

Held: A 9-judge constitution bench unanimously held that privacy is a fundamental right protected under Art. 21 read with Arts. 14 and 19. Privacy includes informational privacy, decisional autonomy, and bodily integrity. Previous judgments in M.P. Sharma and Kharak Singh that denied privacy as a fundamental right were overruled.

Principle: The right to privacy is intrinsic to human dignity and is a constitutionally protected fundamental right. The State can restrict it only if the restriction is backed by law, serves a legitimate State aim, and is proportionate.

R. Rajagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1994) 6 SCC 632 (Supreme Court)

Facts: Auto Shankar, a death-row convict, wrote his autobiography containing details about corrupt officials. A publisher sought to publish it. Tamil Nadu Government sought to restrain publication.

Issue: Whether the Government can restrain publication of an autobiography containing details about government servants; whether there is a constitutional right to privacy under Indian law.

Held: The Supreme Court recognised a right to privacy in India derived from Art. 21. The Court held that in the case of public officials, information about their official conduct is not protected by privacy. However, private information about public figures is protected. The right of the press to publish such an autobiography cannot be restrained by prior injunction unless it is clearly established that the publication is false and will cause irreparable harm.

Principle: Public officials have no privacy right with respect to their official conduct. Prior restraint on publication is disfavoured; post-publication remedies (damages) are the rule, not prior injunctions.

X v. Union of India, 2021 SCC OnLine Del 1788 (Delhi High Court)

Facts: The petitioner (identity masked as ‘X’) sought removal of their name from search results relating to a criminal case in which they had been acquitted. They sought orders under the RTBF doctrine.

Issue: Whether the RTBF exists in Indian law and whether the Delhi HC had jurisdiction to direct removal of online content.

Held: The Delhi HC held that while there is no express statutory right to be forgotten in India (at the time), the right to privacy under Art. 21 encompassed a limited RTBF. The court recognised that past acquittals and outdated criminal records continue to harm individuals digitally, and courts have the power to direct removal or anonymisation in appropriate cases. However, the right must be balanced against freedom of information and journalistic privilege.

Principle: The right to privacy under Art. 21 encompasses a nascent right to be forgotten, to be applied in a fact-specific balancing exercise with freedom of information and public interest.

Swatanter Kumar v. The Indian Express Ltd., 207 (2014) DLT 221 (Delhi High Court)

Facts: A sitting Justice of the Supreme Court of India filed a defamation suit against a newspaper for publishing articles based on complaints made against him. The newspaper sought to establish truth as a defence.

Issue: Whether a sitting judge can sue for defamation; applicability of qualified privilege in reporting on sexual harassment complaints against a public figure.

Held: The Delhi HC recognised that even public figures (including judges) can sue for defamation, but the media’s right to report on matters of public concern, including complaints against public officials, is a strong countervailing right. Fair and accurate reporting on official conduct, even if embarrassing, is protected.

Principle: Reporting on complaints or allegations against a public official in their official capacity is protected journalistic activity, provided it is fair, accurate, and in the public interest.

R.K. Anand v. Registrar, Delhi High Court, (2009) 8 SCC 106 (Supreme Court)

Facts: A TV channel (NDTV) conducted a sting operation revealing that a senior advocate was attempting to suborn witnesses in the BMW hit-and-run case. The sting was telecast. The advocate and the public prosecutor were held to have committed contempt.

Issue: Whether sting operations by media are permissible; whether the telecast interfered with the administration of justice.

Held: The Supreme Court upheld the banning of the advocates from appearing in the case and held that their conduct amounted to contempt. The Court recognised the legitimacy of investigative journalism but distinguished it from entrapment. Here, the media merely recorded an existing corrupt transaction — it was a legitimate revelation of wrongdoing, not inducement.

Principle: A sting operation that records existing criminal conduct without inducing it is legitimate investigative journalism. It is distinguishable from entrapment where the journalist incites the commission of the offence.

Rajat Prasad v. CBI, (2014) 6 SCC 495 (Supreme Court)

Facts: A sting by India TV showed the petitioner (a political functionary) making corrupt offers. He sought quashing of the FIR, arguing the sting was a trap.

Issue: Whether the accused was entrapped; whether the sting evidence is admissible.

Held: The Supreme Court held that whether the sting amounted to entrapment is a question of fact to be determined at trial. The admission of sting evidence is subject to the court’s assessment of authenticity, completeness, and whether the accused was entrapped or merely caught in the act.

Principle: Sting evidence is admissible in Indian courts; however, the court must examine whether the accused was induced to commit an offence they would not otherwise have committed (entrapment) as distinct from being caught in the act of ongoing criminal conduct.

CPIO, Supreme Court of India v. Subhash Chandra Aggarwal, AIR 2010 Delhi 159 (Delhi HC, affirmed by SC)

Facts: An RTI application sought information about the appointment process of Supreme Court judges and their assets declarations. The CPIO refused on grounds that the Supreme Court is not a “public authority” for all purposes.

Issue: Whether the Supreme Court’s administrative (non-judicial) functions are subject to RTI; scope of judicial independence.

Held: The Delhi HC held that the Supreme Court’s administrative functions are subject to RTI. The CJI holds information in a “fiduciary capacity” for the public. Disclosure of judges’ assets (voluntarily filed) is in the public interest and advances accountability. The Supreme Court ultimately upheld the application of RTI to judicial appointments but with safeguards.

Principle: The right to information extends to the administrative functions of constitutional courts. Judicial accountability and transparency are not inconsistent with judicial independence.

M.P. Lohia v. State of West Bengal, (2005) 2 SCC 686 (Supreme Court)

Facts: Intense media coverage of a dowry death case led to public vilification of the accused. The defence argued the accused could not get a fair trial due to prejudicial reporting.

Issue: Whether media trial prejudices the right to fair trial; whether courts should issue gag orders.

Held: The Supreme Court expressed concern about the adverse impact of media trial on the right to a fair trial under Art. 21 and directed the media to exercise restraint in reporting pending cases. The Court reiterated that the media must not assume the role of prosecutor or judge.

Principle: The right to a fair trial is a fundamental right; excessive media coverage that prejudges guilt violates this right. The media must report factually and not sensationally on pending criminal matters.

Naveen Jindal v. Zee Media Corporation Ltd., CS(OS) 143/2015 (Delhi HC)

Facts: A series of TV programmes accused Naveen Jindal (a politician and businessman) of corruption in the coal scam. He filed a defamation suit seeking a gag order.

Issue: Whether the court should grant an interim injunction restraining broadcast of defamatory material; limits of media freedom when reporting on ongoing investigations.

Held: The Delhi HC was cautious about granting prior restraints on the media. Courts must not stifle legitimate investigative journalism by injunctions. However, reporting must be accurate, balanced, and based on verifiable facts. The suit was allowed to proceed and interim relief was granted only partially.

Principle: Prior restraint on media is strongly disfavoured. Courts should not grant injunctions unless publication will cause irreparable harm and the injunction is absolutely necessary; post-publication remedies (damages, corrections) are preferred.

In re S. Mulgaokar v. Unknown, 1978 SCR (3) 162 (Supreme Court)

Facts: The Editor of the Indian Express published an article criticising the Supreme Court and individual judges. Contempt proceedings were initiated.

Issue: Whether criticism of the Supreme Court in a newspaper amounts to criminal contempt by scandalisation.

Held: The Supreme Court laid down that fair and temperate criticism of a judgment or judicial conduct (as distinguished from scurrilous attacks on the personal character of judges) does not amount to contempt. The Court should avoid taking too technical a view. The test is whether the criticism tends to create a real risk of prejudice to the administration of justice, not merely whether it causes embarrassment.

Principle: Criticism of judges and courts, however sharp, is not contempt unless it scandalises the court, i.e., has a real tendency to undermine public confidence in the administration of justice.

Rajendra Sail v. Madhya Pradesh Bar Association, (2005) 6 SCC 109 (Supreme Court)

Facts: Statements made by an advocate on television, branding the High Court judges as “thieves” and alleging corruption, led to contempt proceedings.

Issue: Whether scandalous statements made on television amount to contempt; whether mens rea is required for criminal contempt.

Held: The Supreme Court held that criminal contempt by scandalisation does not require proof of intention (mens rea is not essential). Statements made in any medium (including television) that scandalise the court are punishable. However, the power must be used with restraint to avoid suppressing legitimate criticism.

Principle: Broadcasting or publishing scurrilous, groundless attacks on judges or courts amounts to criminal contempt regardless of the medium used; mens rea is not an essential element of such contempt.

Sanjoy Narayan, Editor-in-Chief, Hindustan v. High Court of Allahabad, 2011 (9) SCALE 532

Facts: The Editor of Hindustan (a Hindi daily) published a cartoon mocking an Allahabad HC order. Contempt proceedings were initiated.

Issue: Whether a satirical cartoon published in a newspaper can amount to contempt of court.

Held: The Allahabad HC held that publishing a cartoon that deliberately ridicules a court order and scandalises the court is criminal contempt. However, the Supreme Court, on appeal, took a more liberal view emphasising the tolerance courts must show to criticism.

Principle: Satire and cartoons, if they cross the line from fair comment to scurrilous attack, may amount to contempt; however, courts must show tolerance and use contempt jurisdiction sparingly.

In re Destruction of Public and Private Properties v. State of A.P., (2009) 5 SCC 119 (Supreme Court)

Facts: This case arose from TV coverage of violent protests that appeared to instigate or glorify destruction of property. The issue of media responsibility for inciting violence was raised.

Issue: Whether broadcasts inciting or glamourising mob violence are covered by broadcasting codes; liability of broadcasters for incitement.

Held: The Supreme Court issued guidelines on responsible broadcasting during public disturbances. Channels must not broadcast material that incites violence or glorifies destruction. Self-regulation must be strengthened; if self-regulation fails, statutory regulation is justified.

Principle: Broadcasting freedom is subject to the responsibility not to incite violence. Media houses can be held accountable for broadcasts that have a direct causal connection to public disorder.

Ajay Goswami v. Union of India, AIR 2007 SC 493 (Supreme Court)

Facts: A petition seeking regulation of obscene content in newspapers and magazines, particularly sexually explicit material easily accessible to minors.

Issue: Whether newspapers publishing obscene content violate community standards; whether the court can direct the press to exercise restraint.

Held: The Supreme Court dismissed the petition but issued directions to the PCI to frame guidelines for protecting minors from obscene content in print media. The Court balanced freedom of the press with community standards of decency and the interest of minors.

Principle: Freedom of the press does not include the right to publish obscene material that violates community standards of decency. Self-regulation by the press is the preferred approach; statutory regulation is a last resort.

Common Cause v. Union of India, (2015) 42 SCD 686 (Supreme Court)

Facts: A challenge to the Government’s practice of spending enormous sums on government advertisements featuring the faces of political leaders, particularly around election time.

Issue: Whether Government can use public funds for political advertising; whether such advertising amounts to violation of the Model Code of Conduct.

Held: The Supreme Court issued comprehensive guidelines prohibiting government advertisements that prominently feature the faces of ruling party leaders or that are political in nature. Government advertising should be informational and serve a genuine public purpose.

Principle: Government funds cannot be used for advertising that amounts to political propaganda in disguise. Such use of public funds violates the principle of equality in the electoral process.

S. Rangarajan v. P. Jagjivan Ram, (1989) 2 SCR 204 (Supreme Court)

Facts: The film “Ore Oru Gramathile” dealt with reservation policy and was initially refused certification. The Tamil Nadu government revoked the certificate fearing public disturbance.

Issue: Whether the government can revoke a film certificate on grounds of anticipated public disturbance; what test applies to censorship of films.

Held: The Supreme Court ordered the film’s release. The State cannot suppress a film merely because it may cause an adverse reaction from some viewers. The test is whether the film has a proximate causal connection to unlawful action, not mere offense. Art. 19(2) does not permit restriction on the grounds that some groups will object to the film’s message.

Principle: A film can only be censored if it has a proximate tendency to cause imminent, identifiable unlawful action. The possibility that some viewers may be offended or angered is not a ground for censorship; the State must protect the film, not suppress it.

Bobby Art International v. Om Pal Singh Hoon, (1996) 4 SCC 1 (Supreme Court)

Facts: The film “Bandit Queen” (based on Phoolan Devi’s life) was certified by CBFC with cuts. A petition sought total banning of the film.

Issue: Whether a film depicting nudity and rape can be censored entirely on grounds of obscenity; test for obscenity in cinema.

Held: The Supreme Court held that the film depicted the reality of sexual violence and exploitation — the nudity and rape scenes served a serious artistic purpose, not prurient interest. A film must be viewed as a whole; isolated scenes cannot be judged without context. Certification with cuts (adult certificate) was upheld; outright ban was refused.

Principle: In evaluating a film for obscenity, the court must consider the work as a whole, its dominant theme, and its literary or artistic purpose, not merely isolated scenes. A film depicting social reality, even harshly, serves public good and merits protection.

Sahara India Real Estate Corp. Ltd. v. SEBI, (2012) 10 SCC 603 (Supreme Court)

Facts: SEBI sought to restrain reporting on ongoing regulatory proceedings against Sahara, arguing that media reports were prejudicing investors and ongoing investigation.

Issue: Whether courts can issue gag orders restraining media from reporting on sub judice regulatory proceedings.

Held: The Supreme Court recognised that “postponement orders” (not outright bans) on media reporting may be issued in exceptional circumstances to protect the administration of justice. The Court laid down guidelines: any postponement order must be (a) time-limited, (b) proportionate, (c) the minimum necessary to protect the legitimate interest, and (d) subject to challenge.

Principle: Postponement orders (temporary gag orders) on media publication may be issued sparingly to protect the administration of justice, subject to strict conditions of necessity, proportionality, and reviewability.

MSM Sharma v. Krishna Sinha, AIR 1959 SC 395 (Supreme Court)

Facts: The Bihar Legislative Assembly ordered the expunction of certain portions of proceedings. MSM Sharma, Editor of Searchlight, published the expunged portion. Contempt proceedings were initiated by the Speaker.

Issue: Whether the privilege of Parliament overrides Art. 19(1)(a) right to publish parliamentary proceedings; can the Speaker punish a person for contempt for publishing expunged proceedings?

Held: The Supreme Court held (by majority) that parliamentary privilege under Art. 194(3) extends to punishing for contempt and that publishing expunged portions could be punished. However, Art. 19(1)(a) protects publication of substantially true proceedings generally.

Principle: While the press has a right to publish parliamentary proceedings, this right yields to parliamentary privilege. Publication of expunged proceedings, after formal direction of the House, can attract contempt.

Ashok Shankarrao Chavan v. Madhavrao Kinhalkar, (2014) 7 SCC 99 (Supreme Court)

Facts: Ashok Chavan, former Maharashtra CM, was found by the Election Commission to have suppressed paid news expenses in his election expense statement. His election was challenged.

Issue: Whether paid news in an election, if not disclosed as election expenditure, amounts to a corrupt practice invalidating the election.

Held: The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s decision setting aside his election. Paid news that is concealed in election expense returns amounts to a corrupt practice. The election of a candidate who conceals such expenditure can be set aside.

Principle: Publication of paid political news without disclosure as election expenditure constitutes a corrupt practice under the Representation of the People Act, 1951, and can invalidate a candidate’s election.