Facts: The question arose whether an arrangement between certain persons for sharing profits and losses constituted a partnership.

Held: The Supreme Court emphasised that to determine the existence of a partnership under Section 4, the court must look at the real nature of the relationship between parties as shown by all relevant facts together (Section 6). Mere sharing of profits is not conclusive evidence of partnership.

Principle: The test of mutual agency and the real nature of the relationship, viewed holistically under Section 6, determines partnership.

Facts: Creditors of a firm agreed to allow the debtors to carry on business and pay them their debts out of profits. The question was whether the creditors became partners.

Held (House of Lords): The mere receipt of a share of profits is not conclusive of partnership. What is essential is whether there is mutual agency — whether the persons share profits as co-principals carrying on business in common. Creditors receiving profits as payment of debts are not partners.

Principle: Receipt of a share of profits alone is not decisive; the critical element is mutual agency and acting for a common business as co-principals.

Facts: A managing agency received a share of profits and also had the right to inspect books and give advice. The question was whether this arrangement constituted partnership.

Held: The Privy Council held that sharing profits, combined with the right to supervise and advise, may create partnership if it constitutes mutual agency. Each case must be examined on its particular facts under Section 6’s totality test.

Principle: The true test of partnership is not profit-sharing but whether there exists mutual agency — whether each person acts as agent for the others in the conduct of a common business.

Facts: Miles (a photographer) entered into partnership with Clarke. The partnership dissolved. The dispute was whether fixtures and goodwill were firm property, or Clarke’s alone.

Held: Only assets brought in or acquired for the firm constitute firm property. Equipment brought by Clarke remained his. Miles’ photographic connections (goodwill) were not firm property as there was no agreement to treat them as such.

Principle: Partnership property is determined by the agreement and actual contributions — not all assets of partners automatically become firm property. Section 14 must be read with the partnership agreement.

Facts: Partners agreed to share profits from sale of stands. One partner purchased a house adjacent to the area of business. The question was whether the other partner had a right to share in the purchase.

Held: Privy Council held that a partner is not obliged to bring in every profit-making opportunity to the partnership unless it falls within the scope of the firm’s business. The firm’s business was selling stands — purchasing houses was outside its scope.

Principle: The duty to account for personal profits (S.16) is limited to profits arising from the firm’s business or from use of firm property/connections. Partners may pursue other business opportunities outside the firm’s scope.

Facts: A firm was sued for damages caused by a partner’s wrongful act. The question was whether the firm was liable.

Held: The firm is liable for wrongful acts of a partner done in the ordinary course of business or with the authority of the other partners (analogous to S.26, IPA). The firm’s liability extends to acts of partners that are authorised or within the implied scope of partnership.

Principle: A firm is vicariously liable for wrongful acts of partners committed in the ordinary course of business.

Facts: A partner pledged firm securities as security for a personal loan. The question was whether the firm was bound.

Held: A partner cannot pledge firm property as security for a personal debt — this is beyond his implied authority. The firm is only bound for acts within the usual course of firm’s business. Pledging firm assets for a partner’s personal debt is clearly outside this scope.

Principle: Implied authority covers only acts done in the usual course of the firm’s business — not acts for the personal benefit of a partner.

Facts: One partner, acting in the ordinary course of business, bribed an employee of a competitor to obtain confidential business information. The question was whether the firm was liable for this wrongful act.

Held: Court of Appeal held that the firm is liable for the wrongful act of the partner, because the partner’s purpose — obtaining commercial information — was within the scope of the firm’s business, even though the means (bribery) was wrongful. Liability arises because the act was done “in relation to the firm’s business.”

Principle: A firm is liable for the wrongful acts of a partner if those acts are done in the ordinary course of the firm’s business — the wrongfulness of the method does not negate liability if the purpose was business-related.

Facts: Christmas and Ingram were partners. Christmas retired. The firm sent a letter on old stationery (which still had Ingram’s name) to Tower Cabinet Co., who then supplied goods on credit. Ingram was unaware the old stationery was used. Tower Cabinet sued Ingram for the unpaid price.

Held: Ingram was NOT liable. For holding out, the person must have knowingly permitted the representation. Since Ingram was unaware that old stationery was used, there was no “knowing permission.” Holding out requires awareness of the representation.

Principle: For liability under holding out (S.28), the retired partner must have knowingly permitted himself to be represented as a partner. Mere coincidental continuation of old stationery without knowledge does not constitute holding out.

Facts: A minor was admitted to benefits of a partnership firm. The firm was dissolved before the minor attained majority. After attaining majority, the minor did not give notice under Section 30(5). A creditor sought to make the minor personally liable.

Held: The minor cannot exercise the option under Section 30(5) to elect to become a partner if the firm itself no longer exists. The option to elect presupposes the firm is in existence. If the firm was dissolved during minority, the minor remains with limited liability (only his share), and no personal liability arises upon attaining majority.

Principle: The six-month option under Section 30(5) is available only if the partnership is still subsisting. If dissolved during the minor’s minority, he cannot exercise the option and retains limited liability.

Facts: Questions arose about whether a change in constitution of a firm resulted in a new firm for tax purposes, and about the effect of reconstitution on the firm’s registration.

Held: The Supreme Court held that a change in the constitution of a firm (by admission, retirement, death, or expulsion of a partner) does not create a new firm if the business continues. Registration once granted to a firm continues unless a new registration is obtained after reconstitution.

Principle: Reconstitution of a firm does not automatically dissolve it or create a new entity; the firm continues unless the changes are of such a nature as to amount to dissolution.

Facts: An unregistered firm filed a suit for recovery of money. The defendants objected that as the firm was unregistered, it could not maintain the suit.

Held: The Supreme Court confirmed that Section 69(2) of the Indian Partnership Act bars an unregistered firm from filing any suit to enforce a right arising from a contract. However, this bar applies only to suits arising from contract — not to suits for other reliefs (like tort).

Principle: An unregistered firm cannot sue to enforce contractual rights (Section 69), but partners/firm can sue for non-contractual claims. Non-registration is a disability, not total incapacity.

Facts: A partnership firm used the trademark “Haldiram’s.” After dissolution, one partner continued using it. The other partners of the erstwhile firm sued for infringement and passing off.

Held: The Supreme Court held that a suit for protection of trademark/goodwill does not arise from a “contract” in the sense of Section 69 — it arises from property rights. Therefore, even if the firm was not registered at the time of suit, the action could be maintained. The disability under Section 69 applies only to suits arising from contracts made in the course of business.

Principle: The disability of non-registration under Section 69 applies to enforcement of contractual rights only. Suits for trademark, intellectual property, or other proprietary rights can be maintained by unregistered firms.

Facts: An unregistered firm entered into a contract with a housing society. A dispute arose and the firm sought arbitration. The society objected to arbitrability on grounds of non-registration.

Held: The Supreme Court held that Section 69(2) bars suits in court but not necessarily arbitral proceedings. The bar under Section 69 relates to “suits” — arbitration is not a “suit.” An arbitration clause in a contract is a separate agreement from the main contract and can be independently enforced.

Principle: The bar of non-registration under Section 69 applies to court suits, not to arbitration proceedings. An unregistered firm may enforce an arbitration clause independently of the main contract.

Facts: A partnership dissolved. The question arose about the mode of settlement of accounts between partners — specifically whether the rule in Section 48 (loss to be borne in profits ratio, then capital ratio, then equally) was mandatory.

Held: The Supreme Court held that Section 48 lays down the rule for settling accounts on dissolution subject to a contrary agreement. The default rule — losses borne in the same proportion as profits are shared — applies only in the absence of contrary agreement. Partners may agree to a different mode of settlement.

Principle: The mode of settlement of accounts under Section 48 is the default rule and can be modified by the partnership agreement. Courts must give effect to contrary agreements of the partners.

Facts: Dispute arose between partners over dissolution and winding up. One partner claimed the firm should be dissolved by the court.

Held: The Supreme Court emphasised that dissolution by court under Section 44 requires a partner to file a suit. Dissolution by notice under Section 43 is available only for a partnership “at will.” If the partnership has a fixed term that has not expired, a partner cannot unilaterally dissolve by notice. The appropriate remedy is a suit under Section 44.

Principle: Dissolution by notice (S.43) is only available for partnerships at will. For fixed-term partnerships, dissolution requires court order (S.44) or agreement of all partners (S.40).

Facts: A lawyer retained his client’s case files and claimed them as “goods” for asserting a lien against unpaid fees.

Held: The Supreme Court held that a lawyer cannot exercise lien over client files as such files are the property of the client and are not “goods” in the commercial sense under the Sale of Goods Act. There is a distinction between tangible goods and documents relating to a client’s legal proceedings.

Principle: Not all movable property constitutes “goods” for the purposes of commercial transactions. Professional documents like case files have a different legal character.

Facts: The question was whether electricity could be treated as “goods” for the purpose of sales tax levy.

Held: The Supreme Court held that electricity is “goods” for the purposes of Article 286 of the Constitution and sales tax legislation. The definition of goods in the Constitution (and Sales Tax Acts) is broader than under the Sale of Goods Act and includes electricity, gas, and similar things.

Principle: “Goods” under the Sale of Goods Act is narrower than under constitutional/sales tax law. Electricity, while not traditional “goods” under SGA, can be taxed as goods under broader definitions in tax legislation.

Facts: The State sought to levy sales tax on the total value of a building contract, including the value of materials used. Gannon Dunkerley argued that the building contract was not a “sale of goods” but a “works contract.”

Held: The Supreme Court (7-judge bench) held that a “sale of goods” under the Constitution requires: (a) a seller, (b) a buyer, (c) an agreement to sell for money, (d) passing of property. A building contract is an “indivisible works contract” — not a contract for sale of goods. The materials in a works contract cannot be separately taxed as “goods” sold.

Principle: The watershed case distinguishing “sale of goods” from “works/labour contracts.” A building contract is an indivisible contract for labour and service — it is not a sale of goods even though materials are used. The value of materials cannot be subjected to sales tax.

Facts: L&T entered into contracts for construction of large infrastructure projects. The state sought to levy VAT on the full value of materials used. L&T argued only the actual transfer of property value in goods should be taxed.

Held (9-judge bench): After the 46th Amendment, works contracts can be divisible into a “sale of goods” component (taxable) and a “service component” (non-taxable). States can levy tax only on the value of goods transferred — not on the full contract value. The principle of “dominant purpose test” from pre-amendment era no longer applies — every works contract can be split.

Principle: Post-46th Amendment, every indivisible works contract can be split into sale of goods and service components. States can tax the sale component (Article 366(29-A)). The “dominant nature test” has been discarded in favour of the “split” theory.

Facts: Kone contracted to install elevators in buildings. The state sought to tax the full contract value as a sale of goods. Kone argued it was primarily a works contract.

Held (5-judge bench): Held that an elevator installation contract is a “works contract” (the dominant element being service/installation — not sale of a ready-made elevator). Post-46th Amendment, only the value of goods transferred can be taxed. Kone’s contracts involved significant service element and could not be treated as pure sale of goods.

Principle: In contracts for supply and installation of machinery/equipment, the “works contract” characterisation applies where the installation service is substantial. Only the goods component is taxable under sales tax, not the service component.

Facts: Priest purchased a hot water bottle from Last, a chemist, for use as a hot water bottle. The bottle burst and injured Mrs. Priest. Priest did not communicate any specific purpose — he simply asked for a hot water bottle.

Held: Court of Appeal held that since there was only one purpose for which such goods are ordinarily used, there was an implied condition that the goods were fit for that purpose. The buyer had communicated the purpose by asking for a “hot water bottle” (by description), and it was reasonable for the buyer to rely on the chemist’s skill.

Principle: Where a buyer purchases goods by description for a particular purpose, and relies on the seller’s skill or judgment, there is an implied condition of fitness for purpose (S.16(1)). This applies even where the buyer has not explicitly stated the purpose — it may be implied from the nature of the goods and the circumstances of purchase.

Facts: Jones agreed to buy hemp from Just by sample. The goods delivered were inferior to the sample — they had been damaged during transit. Jones rejected them.

Held: Court held that in a sale by sample, there is an implied condition that: (a) the bulk must correspond with the sample; (b) the buyer must have a reasonable opportunity to compare; (c) goods must be free from latent defects rendering them unmerchantable that would not be apparent on reasonable examination of the sample.

Principle: In a sale by sample (S.17), conditions include: (1) bulk corresponds to sample; (2) buyer can compare; (3) no hidden defects making goods unmerchantable. Damaged goods do not satisfy an implied condition of correspondence with sample.

Facts: Grant purchased woollen underwear manufactured by Australian Knitting Mills. He developed a serious skin condition due to excess sulphite in the garments — a defect not visible on inspection. Grant sued for breach of implied condition of merchantable quality and fitness for purpose.

Held: The Privy Council held that: (a) there was breach of the implied condition of merchantable quality (goods must be free from latent defects rendering them unmerchantable); and (b) there was breach of implied condition of fitness for purpose (the purpose — wearing as underwear — was apparent and the buyer relied on the seller’s skill). The seller was liable.

Principle: “Merchantable quality” means goods must be free from latent defects that make them unmerchantable. If goods suffer from such defects even though apparently satisfactory, the condition of merchantability is breached. The seller’s liability is strict — ignorance of the defect is no defence.

Facts: The company argued that certain goods were sold before property had actually passed, affecting their tax treatment. The question was when “sale” for tax purposes occurs.

Held: The Supreme Court reiterated that “sale” in law requires the passing of property (ownership) from seller to buyer. A transaction is a “sale” only when property in goods actually transfers — the transfer of possession alone is insufficient. This is consistent with Section 4 of the Sale of Goods Act.

Principle: “Sale” requires actual transfer of property (legal ownership), not merely delivery or possession. The moment of sale is when property passes, which determines rights, risks, and tax obligations.

Facts: Pearson left his car with a mercantile agent to sell at a minimum price. The agent obtained the registration document by trick (without Pearson’s authority) and sold the car with the document to a bona fide buyer (Rose & Young). Pearson sought to recover the car.

Held: Court of Appeal held that for a mercantile agent to pass good title under the Factors Act (equivalent to Section 27, SGA), the agent must have been given possession of the goods with the owner’s consent. Here, while the car was given with consent, the registration document was obtained by trick — not with consent. Since a car without registration documents cannot normally be sold in the ordinary course of business, the sale was not in the ordinary course of business. Pearson could recover the car.

Principle: For a mercantile agent exception to apply, possession of goods AND the documents of title must have been entrusted with the owner’s consent. Sale without documents of title is not “in the ordinary course of business” where such documents are normally required.

Facts: Goods were sold under a conditional sale (property reserved with seller). The buyer resold to a third party who was bona fide. The seller claimed priority.

Held: The Supreme Court examined the “seller in possession” exception. Where a seller retains property but parts with possession, and the buyer in possession transfers to a bona fide buyer, the rights of the original seller may be defeated if the case falls within Section 30 exceptions.

Principle: The exceptions to nemo dat are narrowly construed. Each exception requires specific facts — good faith and value are essential ingredients for any exception to apply.