From Criminalisation to Compliance: The Jan Vishwas (Amendment of Provisions) Bill, 2025 and the Constitutional Imperatives of Proportionate Punishment and Ease of Governance
By Guru Legal
Keywords: Jan Vishwas (Amendment of Provisions) Bill, 2025; Jan Vishwas Act, 2023; decriminalisation; proportionality; ease of doing business; Constitution of India, 1950; Article 14; Article 19; Article 21; Central Silk Board Act, 1948, Section 14; Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, Section 33-I; compounding of offences; trust-based governance; penal reform; administrative adjudication; legislative reform
Abstract
The Jan Vishwas (Amendment of Provisions) Bill, 2025 (hereinafter, the Jan Vishwas Bill, 2025 or the Bill) represents the second phase of India’s legislative endeavour to rationalise and decriminalise provisions across a wide range of Central statutes that impose disproportionate criminal sanctions, including imprisonment, for minor regulatory infractions and technical defaults committed by citizens and business entities. The first phase of this initiative, embodied in the Jan Vishwas (Amendment of Provisions) Act, 2023 (hereinafter, the Jan Vishwas Act, 2023), amended forty-two Central Acts and decriminalised one hundred and eighty-three provisions. The Bill, 2025, commonly referred to as Jan Vishwas 2.0, proposes amendments to three hundred and fifty-five provisions across sixteen Central Acts, decriminalising two hundred and eighty-eight provisions relating to business and sixty-seven provisions pertaining to citizens. The legislative rationale for both phases of this reform, as stated in the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Jan Vishwas Act, 2023, is to enhance trust-based governance, reduce the burden on citizens and businesses arising from disproportionate penal provisions, and promote ease of living and ease of doing business in India. Notwithstanding the commendable objectives of the Bill, certain structural criticisms merit careful consideration, including the adequacy of monetary penalties as a deterrent for larger enterprises, the implications of decriminalisation for public safety in sectors such as pharmaceuticals, and the risk of corruption in the proposed administrative adjudication mechanisms. This article examines the constitutional foundations of the proportionality principle underlying the Bill, analyses its principal features and structural criticisms, and advances a set of legislative recommendations to address the identified concerns.
Introduction
The relationship between penal law and constitutional governance in India has long been marked by a fundamental tension between the State’s legitimate interest in using criminal sanctions to enforce regulatory compliance and the constitutional guarantees of personal liberty and proportionality that limit the State’s power to criminalise conduct. The Constitution of India, 1950 (hereinafter, the Constitution), does not expressly enumerate a principle of proportionality in penalisation, but the Supreme Court of India has, through its interpretation of Articles 14 and 21, progressively developed a constitutional doctrine that requires the State to ensure that the sanctions imposed for regulatory infractions bear a reasonable and proportionate relationship to the gravity of the conduct concerned. The use of imprisonment as a sanction for minor technical defaults, administrative lapses, and regulatory non-compliances that cause no significant harm to any person or to the public interest has been the subject of sustained criticism from legal scholars, law reform bodies, and business associations in India for several decades.
It is against this backdrop that the Jan Vishwas (Amendment of Provisions) Act, 2023 and its successor, the Jan Vishwas Bill, 2025, represent a significant and long-overdue legislative response to the problem of over-criminalisation in Indian regulatory law. The Jan Vishwas Act, 2023 constituted the first systematic attempt by the Government of India to identify and rationalise penal provisions across Central legislation that were disproportionate, archaic, or otherwise inconsistent with the principles of trust-based governance and ease of living. The Jan Vishwas Bill, 2025, building upon this foundation, proposes a considerably more extensive programme of decriminalisation, covering three hundred and fifty-five provisions across sixteen Central Acts, reflecting the Government’s recognition that the first phase of reform, while substantial, did not address the full scope of the problem.
The constitutional significance of this legislative initiative is considerable. The principle that the State ought not to criminalise conduct that does not pose a genuine and proportionate threat to persons or to the public interest is rooted in the constitutional values of liberty, dignity, and equality enshrined in Articles 14, 19, and 21 of the Constitution. The imposition of imprisonment for minor regulatory defaults not only infringes the personal liberty of those subjected to such punishment but also operates as a discriminatory burden upon economically weaker citizens and smaller business enterprises, who are less well-placed than larger entities to navigate the criminal justice system. The Jan Vishwas Bill, 2025, by replacing imprisonment with monetary penalties for a large class of such offences and by introducing a system of administrative adjudication and compounding, seeks to give effect to these constitutional values in the sphere of regulatory law.
This article is organised as follows. The first part examines the constitutional and jurisprudential basis for the principle of proportionality in penalisation and its application to regulatory offences under Indian law. The second part analyses the principal features of the Jan Vishwas Bill, 2025, including the introduction of warning notices for first-time offenders, the replacement of imprisonment with monetary penalties, the periodic escalation of fines, and the expansion of administrative adjudication mechanisms. The third part examines the structural criticisms directed at the Bill and their constitutional implications. The fourth part advances a set of legislative and policy recommendations aimed at addressing the identified gaps in the reform framework.
Constitutional Foundations of Proportionality in Penal Regulation: Articles 14, 19, and 21
The constitutional principle of proportionality in the imposition of criminal sanctions is derived, in the Indian constitutional context, from the convergence of Articles 14, 19, and 21 of the Constitution of India, 1950. Article 14, which guarantees the right to equality before law and the equal protection of the laws, has been interpreted by the Supreme Court of India to prohibit not only discriminatory legislation but also arbitrary State action, including the imposition of grossly disproportionate sanctions that bear no reasonable nexus to a legitimate State objective. The test of reasonable classification under Article 14, as articulated in State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, AIR 1952 SC 75, and subsequently elaborated in a long line of decisions, requires that any legal distinction drawn by the legislature be based upon an intelligible differentia bearing a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved. Where the sanction of imprisonment is imposed for regulatory infractions that are minor, technical, or non-harmful, the rational nexus between the sanction and any legitimate State objective is frequently difficult to establish.
Article 19 of the Constitution guarantees several fundamental freedoms, including the freedom to practise any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade, or business under Article 19(1)(g), subject to the reasonable restrictions that may be imposed by the State under Article 19(6) in the interests of the general public or for the protection of the interests of any scheduled tribe. The imposition of imprisonment as a sanction for minor regulatory defaults by businesses constitutes a restriction upon the freedom of trade and business guaranteed by Article 19(1)(g), and must therefore satisfy the test of reasonableness under Article 19(6). Where the sanction of imprisonment for minor defaults is so disproportionate as to be unreasonable, it is liable to be struck down as an unconstitutional restriction upon the freedom of business. The Jan Vishwas Bill, 2025, by replacing such disproportionate sanctions with monetary penalties and administrative mechanisms, seeks to bring the regulatory framework into conformity with the constitutional standard of reasonableness.
Article 21 of the Constitution guarantees the right to life and personal liberty, and, as the Supreme Court held in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248, requires that any procedure by which a person is deprived of liberty be just, fair, and reasonable. The use of imprisonment as a sanction for minor regulatory infractions engages Article 21 directly, since any conviction and incarceration resulting from such provisions constitutes a deprivation of personal liberty. The proportionality standard implicit in the requirement of just, fair, and reasonable procedure under Article 21 militates against the imposition of imprisonment for offences that do not involve moral culpability, violence, or significant harm to others. The Law Commission of India, in its Report No. 277 (2018) on Wrongful Prosecution (Miscarriage of Justice): Legal Remedies, noted with concern the adverse impact of over-criminalisation upon the liberty of ordinary citizens and business persons who are prosecuted for technical regulatory defaults.
Principal Features of the Jan Vishwas Bill, 2025: Decriminalisation, Administrative Adjudication, and Periodic Fine Escalation
The Jan Vishwas (Amendment of Provisions) Bill, 2025 introduces a comprehensive framework of decriminalisation and regulatory rationalisation across sixteen Central Acts. The most significant feature of the Bill is the replacement of imprisonment, or imprisonment coupled with fine, as the sanction for a large class of regulatory offences, with monetary penalties of varying amounts. The legislative approach adopted in the Bill reflects an important recognition that imprisonment is an inappropriate sanction for minor regulatory lapses that do not involve violence, fraud, or significant harm to the public, and that monetary penalties, graduated according to the gravity of the offence and the financial capacity of the offender, are a more proportionate and effective means of securing regulatory compliance. By way of illustration, the proposed amendment to Section 14(1) of the Central Silk Board Act, 1948 replaces the punishment of imprisonment for a term that may extend to one year with a system under which first-time offenders receive a warning notice, and continuing or repeated offenders become liable to a penalty of not less than twenty-five thousand rupees, extendable to one lakh rupees. This approach reflects the principle of progressive enforcement, giving regulatory violators an opportunity to rectify their conduct before more severe consequences are imposed.
A second significant feature of the Bill is the provision for a mandatory increase of ten per cent in the fines and penalties prescribed under the amended provisions every three years, without the need for further legislative amendment. This mechanism is designed to ensure that the deterrent effect of monetary penalties is maintained over time against the erosion caused by inflation and by the increasing capacity of larger enterprises to absorb monetary penalties as a cost of doing business. The automatic escalation of penalties is a legislative innovation that reflects comparative best practice in regulatory design, and finds precedent in the approach adopted in regulatory frameworks in the United Kingdom under the Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Act, 2008, and in Australia under the Regulatory Powers (Standard Provisions) Act, 2014. The third major feature of the Bill is the expansion of administrative adjudication and compounding mechanisms as alternatives to judicial proceedings for a range of minor regulatory offences. The creation of such mechanisms is intended to reduce the burden on the subordinate courts, which are already overburdened with criminal cases, and to enable the expeditious resolution of regulatory defaults through specialised administrative bodies with the relevant expertise.
Consequences and Implications for Indian Governance and the Legal Framework
The enactment of the Jan Vishwas Bill, 2025, if accompanied by appropriate safeguards addressing the structural criticisms identified in this article, has the potential to produce a significant and beneficial transformation in the regulatory environment in India. By removing the threat of imprisonment from a large class of minor regulatory offences, the Bill would reduce the scope for the coercive use of criminal law by regulatory authorities against citizens and businesses, a practice that has been widely documented and criticised as inconsistent with the constitutional principles of equality and personal liberty. The Law Commission of India, in Report No. 237 (2011) on Conventional Areas of Mutual Legal Assistance, noted that the proliferation of criminal sanctions in Indian regulatory law had created a climate of regulatory uncertainty that was inimical to economic activity and that imposed disproportionate costs upon small and medium enterprises. The Jan Vishwas Bill, 2025 directly addresses this concern.
Notwithstanding these benefits, the Bill’s approach to decriminalisation is not without its risks. The replacement of imprisonment with monetary penalties for offences involving public safety, such as the manufacture and sale of adulterated or substandard medicines under Section 33-I of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, raises serious questions about the adequacy of the regulatory framework to protect the health and wellbeing of citizens. Empirical studies conducted by the Central Drugs Standard Control Organisation indicate that the incidence of spurious and substandard medicines in India remains markedly high, and that the availability of a criminal sanction, including imprisonment, has served as a significant deterrent against egregious regulatory violations in the pharmaceutical sector. The blanket replacement of imprisonment with monetary fines in such cases, without adequate differentiation between minor lapses and serious violations, risks undermining public safety in a sector where the consequences of regulatory failure can be severe and irreversible.
The Case for Reform: Legislative and Judicial Recommendations
The first area of reform concerns the need for a more nuanced and graduated approach to decriminalisation. It is submitted that the Jan Vishwas Bill, 2025 ought to incorporate a framework that distinguishes between different categories of regulatory offences on the basis of the degree of harm or risk of harm to the public, rather than adopting a blanket approach to the replacement of imprisonment with monetary penalties. Offences that involve a significant risk of harm to public health, safety, or the environment, such as violations under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986, and the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006, ought to retain the sanction of imprisonment for serious or repeated violations, while only truly minor and technical defaults with no meaningful public impact are fully decriminalised. A proportionality matrix, drawing upon the methodology recommended by the Law Commission of India in Report No. 237 (2011), could provide the legislative basis for such differentiation.
The second area of reform concerns the adequacy of monetary penalties as a deterrent for large enterprises. The Bill’s provision for automatic escalation of penalties by ten per cent every three years is a welcome but insufficient response to the concern that monetary penalties may be too low to deter large corporations from committing regulatory violations as a rational economic choice. It is submitted that the Bill ought to incorporate a turnover-based penalty regime for larger enterprises, under which penalties for repeated regulatory violations are calculated as a percentage of the enterprise’s annual turnover rather than as a fixed monetary amount. Such a regime, modelled upon the approach adopted in the European Union under the General Data Protection Regulation and in the United Kingdom under the Competition Act, 1998, would ensure that the deterrent effect of monetary penalties is proportionate to the financial capacity of the offender.
The third area of reform pertains to the governance and accountability of the administrative adjudication mechanisms proposed in the Bill. The substitution of judicial proceedings with administrative adjudication for a range of regulatory offences raises legitimate concerns about the independence, impartiality, and accountability of the adjudicatory bodies concerned. It is submitted that the Bill ought to incorporate provisions establishing the following safeguards for the administrative adjudication process: the appointment of adjudicatory officers who satisfy minimum qualifications in law; the right of the person proceeded against to be heard and to be represented by a legal practitioner of their choice; the right of appeal against the order of the adjudicatory authority to the appropriate Tribunal or High Court; and the prohibition of the adjudicating authority from having any pecuniary or administrative interest in the outcome of the proceedings.
The fourth area of reform concerns the need for a comprehensive review mechanism to assess the effectiveness of the decriminalisation measures introduced by the Jan Vishwas Bill, 2025 after a period of implementation. It is submitted that the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Commerce and Industry ought to establish a joint committee, comprising representatives of the relevant regulatory authorities, civil society organisations, and legal experts, to conduct a formal review of the impact of the Bill’s provisions upon regulatory compliance, access to justice, and public safety within a period of three years from the date of the Bill’s enactment, and to submit a report to Parliament with recommendations for further legislative action as appropriate. Such a review mechanism would ensure that the reform process is evidence-based and responsive to the practical consequences of decriminalisation in specific regulatory sectors.
The fifth area of reform addresses the need to ensure that the administrative adjudication and compounding mechanisms established by the Bill are accompanied by adequate legal aid for citizens who are proceeded against before such bodies. The right to legal representation before administrative adjudicatory bodies is not always expressly guaranteed by the enabling legislation, and there is a risk that the replacement of judicial proceedings, before which the right to legal aid under Section 12 of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 is available, with administrative proceedings may result in a diminution of the access-to-justice protections available to persons of limited financial means. It is submitted that the Bill ought to expressly provide that persons proceeded against before the administrative adjudicatory bodies established thereunder are entitled to free legal assistance from the Legal Services Authority of the relevant State, where such persons are unable to afford legal representation.
Conclusion
The Jan Vishwas (Amendment of Provisions) Bill, 2025 represents a significant and constitutionally grounded effort to address the long-standing problem of over-criminalisation in Indian regulatory law, and to bring the penal framework governing citizens and businesses into conformity with the constitutional principles of proportionality, liberty, and equality enshrined in Articles 14, 19, and 21 of the Constitution of India, 1950. The Bill’s introduction of warning notices for first-time offenders, replacement of imprisonment with monetary penalties for a large class of minor regulatory offences, provision for automatic escalation of fines, and expansion of administrative adjudication mechanisms collectively represent a transformative departure from the archaic and disproportionate regulatory framework that has long inhibited ease of living and ease of doing business in India. It is submitted, however, that the realisation of the Bill’s constitutional promise requires the adoption of the structural reforms recommended in this article, reforms that would ensure that decriminalisation is graduated according to the public interest impact of each category of offence, that monetary penalties are genuinely deterrent for enterprises of all sizes, and that the administrative adjudication mechanisms established by the Bill are governed by principles of independence, fairness, and accountability consistent with the constitutional values of the Republic.
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ)
Q1. What is the Jan Vishwas (Amendment of Provisions) Bill, 2025, and what statutory changes does it propose?
The Jan Vishwas (Amendment of Provisions) Bill, 2025, commonly referred to as Jan Vishwas 2.0, is the second phase of the Government of India’s legislative initiative to decriminalise and rationalise disproportionate penal provisions across Central statutes. The Bill proposes amendments to three hundred and fifty-five provisions across sixteen Central Acts, decriminalising two hundred and eighty-eight provisions relating to business and sixty-seven provisions relating to citizens by replacing the sanction of imprisonment, or imprisonment combined with fine, with monetary penalties, warning notices for first-time offenders, and administrative adjudication mechanisms. The first phase of this initiative, the Jan Vishwas (Amendment of Provisions) Act, 2023, had amended forty-two Central Acts and decriminalised one hundred and eighty-three provisions. The legislative basis for the reform is the constitutional imperative of proportionality in penalisation, derived from Articles 14, 19, and 21 of the Constitution of India, 1950.
Q2. What remedy is available to a citizen or business aggrieved by an order made under the administrative adjudication mechanism established by the Bill?
A citizen or business entity aggrieved by an order made by an administrative adjudicatory authority established under the Jan Vishwas (Amendment of Provisions) Bill, 2025, may challenge such an order by way of an appeal before the appropriate Tribunal or, where no specialised Tribunal has jurisdiction, before the High Court of the relevant State under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, 1950. Where the aggrieved person is of the view that the order violates a fundamental right guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution, including the right to equality under Article 14 or the right to carry on business under Article 19(1)(g), a writ petition may be filed before the appropriate High Court or, in cases of fundamental rights violations, before the Supreme Court of India under Article 32 of the Constitution. It is submitted that the Bill ought to expressly provide for a statutory right of appeal against administrative adjudication orders, with clearly prescribed time limits for the disposal of such appeals.
Q3. What penalties are prescribed for repeated regulatory violations under the Jan Vishwas Bill, 2025?
The Jan Vishwas (Amendment of Provisions) Bill, 2025 prescribes a graduated penalty framework for regulatory violations under the amended Central Acts. First-time offenders are to receive warning notices giving them an opportunity to rectify their conduct, in accordance with the principle of progressive enforcement. For continuing or repeated violations, the relevant provisions prescribe monetary penalties that vary according to the specific Act and the nature of the offence; by way of illustration, the proposed amendment to Section 14(1) of the Central Silk Board Act, 1948, provides for a penalty of not less than twenty-five thousand rupees, extendable to one lakh rupees, for continuing or repeated offenders. The Bill further provides for an automatic increase of ten per cent in all fines and penalties prescribed under the amended provisions every three years, ensuring the maintenance of their deterrent effect without the need for further legislative amendment.
Q4. What proactive obligation does the State bear in implementing the decriminalisation framework established by the Jan Vishwas Bill, 2025?
The State bears a positive obligation, derived from the constitutional principles of proportionality under Articles 14, 19, and 21 of the Constitution of India, 1950, to ensure that the decriminalisation framework established by the Jan Vishwas (Amendment of Provisions) Bill, 2025 is implemented in a manner that is fair, transparent, and accessible to all citizens and businesses, including those from economically marginalised communities. This obligation includes the duty to establish administrative adjudication mechanisms that are independent, impartial, and equipped with the procedural safeguards necessary to ensure fair hearings, the duty to ensure that persons proceeded against before such mechanisms are provided with access to free legal aid under the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 where they are unable to afford legal representation, and the duty to monitor the implementation of the decriminalisation measures to ensure that they are achieving their intended objectives of ease of living and trust-based governance.
Q5. What are the principal limitations and criticisms of the Jan Vishwas Bill, 2025?
The principal limitations and criticisms of the Jan Vishwas (Amendment of Provisions) Bill, 2025 may be summarised as follows. First, the Bill’s blanket approach to the replacement of imprisonment with monetary penalties across a wide range of regulatory sectors, without adequate differentiation between minor technical defaults and serious violations with significant public safety implications, risks compromising public health and safety in sectors such as pharmaceuticals, where the sanction of imprisonment under Section 33-I of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, has served as an important deterrent. Second, the monetary penalties prescribed by the Bill may be insufficient to deter large enterprises for whom such penalties represent a minor cost of doing business, necessitating the adoption of a turnover-based penalty regime for larger offenders. Third, the administrative adjudication mechanisms proposed by the Bill may be susceptible to corruption and lack of accountability unless accompanied by robust safeguards regarding the independence, qualifications, and accountability of adjudicating officers. Fourth, the Bill has been criticised for adopting a blanket approach without a rigorous, sector-by-sector analysis of the impact of decriminalisation upon regulatory compliance and public safety.
Bibliography
Primary Sources
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– Jan Vishwas (Amendment of Provisions) Act, 2023 (Act No. 18 of 2023).
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