Case Name: Dileep Kumar Pandey v. Union of India & Ors.
Court: Supreme Court of India
Citation: CA 11378 of 2013
Bench: Justice Abhay S. Oka (Majority), Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah (Dissenting)
Appellant: Dileep Kumar Pandey and Sanjay Kumar Sharma
Respondents: Union of India & Ors.
Date of Judgment: 21 May 2025
Introduction
These consolidated civil appeals before the Supreme Court of India raised the question of whether the Indian Air Force School at Bamrauli, run by the Indian Air Force Educational and Cultural Society, a registered private society, constitutes a “State” or an “other authority” within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India and is accordingly amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226. The two appellants, a Physical Education teacher and a former school principal respectively, had filed writ petitions before the High Court contesting adverse employment decisions. Both petitions were dismissed on the ground that the school did not qualify as “State” under Article 12 and that the employment disputes were therefore not justiciable in writ proceedings. The appeals required the Supreme Court to apply the settled test of deep and pervasive governmental control to the specific institutional arrangements of the Air Force School at Bamrauli, and to determine whether the school’s close functional association with the Indian Air Force is sufficient to bring it within the constitutional concept of “State”. The judgment also produced a notable dissent from Justice Amanullah, who took the contrary view that the school’s performance of a public function and the Air Force’s deep involvement in its affairs warranted its treatment as “State”.
Summary of Facts
The Indian Air Force School at Bamrauli is operated by the Indian Air Force Educational and Cultural Society, a registered society. The first appellant, Dileep Kumar Pandey, was selected by Air Force officers to serve as a Physical Education teacher at the school in 2005. His probation was extended and he was declared surplus in 2007, whereupon he was offered a contractual position rather than a permanent one. He filed a writ petition claiming status as a confirmed teacher. The High Court Single Judge ruled in his favour, but the Division Bench reversed this decision. The second appellant, Sanjay Kumar Sharma, was a confirmed teacher who later served as officiating principal. He faced disciplinary proceedings and was terminated. He filed writ petitions contesting the disciplinary action and the appointment of a different principal. Both the Single Judge and the Division Bench dismissed his petitions on the ground that the school was not “State” under Article 12. Both appellants appealed to the Supreme Court of India.
Issues Before the Court
1. Whether the Indian Air Force School, Bamrauli, run by the Indian Air Force Educational and Cultural Society, constitutes a “State” or “other authority” within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India and is thereby amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226.
2. Whether the Indian Air Force exercises deep and pervasive control over the school sufficient to bring it within the concept of “State” under the tests laid down by the Supreme Court.
3. Whether writ petitions contesting service-related disputes with the school can be maintained.
Arguments Given by Both Parties
Arguments on Behalf of the Appellant
The appellants submitted that the Indian Air Force School at Bamrauli was so closely integrated with the Indian Air Force, in terms of its governance, administration, financial support, and the exercise of disciplinary authority by Air Force officers over the school’s affairs, that it effectively functioned as an instrumentality of the State. It was argued that the school was established to serve the educational needs of the children of Air Force personnel, a purpose directly linked to the State’s defence function, and that its constitutional character should be assessed by reference to the functional and institutional reality of its relationship with the Air Force rather than by formal criteria of incorporation or ownership.
Arguments on Behalf of the Respondents
The Union of India submitted that the Indian Air Force Educational and Cultural Society is a registered private society that was not created by the government, is not funded by government grants, and operates under its own constitutional documents without statutory backing. The applicable Education Code governing the school is not a statutory instrument. The school’s funding comes from tuition fees and welfare funds, not from the public exchequer. The government does not exercise the kind of deep and pervasive control over the school’s day-to-day functioning that is required to bring an entity within the concept of “State” under Article 12, as articulated in Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi and subsequent decisions.
Reasonings and Findings
The majority judgment, written by Justice Abhay S. Oka, held that the Air Force School at Bamrauli does not satisfy the tests for being treated as “State” under Article 12 of the Constitution of India. The Court applied the multi-factor test drawn from Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi, which looks at whether the body was created by statute, whether it is substantially financed by government funds, whether the government has deep and pervasive control over its management and policies, and whether the functions performed are of a governmental or public character.
On each of these factors, the majority found that the Air Force School at Bamrauli fell short. The school was not created by statute or by the government but by a registered society. It does not receive substantial government funding; its revenues come primarily from tuition fees and welfare funds sourced from non-public origins. The Education Code governing the school does not have statutory force. The Air Force’s involvement in the school’s governance, while substantial in a functional sense, does not amount to the deep and pervasive governmental control that would bring the school within Article 12. The majority accordingly dismissed the appeals, while noting that the appellants were not without remedy and could pursue claims in the civil courts or through other appropriate forums.
Justice Amanullah, dissenting, took the view that the Air Force’s close relationship with the school, its involvement in financial and administrative decisions, and the functional reality of the school as a service provided for Air Force personnel were sufficient to bring the school within the concept of an instrumentality of the State. The learned judge emphasised that the performance of a public function such as education, combined with deep functional and disciplinary control by the Air Force, ought to attract the constitutional protections of writ jurisdiction.
Judgment and Conclusion
The Supreme Court of India dismissed both appeals by majority, holding that the Indian Air Force School at Bamrauli does not constitute a “State” or “other authority” under Article 12 of the Constitution of India. Writ petitions contesting employment disputes with the school were held to be not maintainable. The dissenting opinion of Justice Amanullah took the contrary view, finding sufficient State character on the basis of the school’s deep functional integration with the Indian Air Force.
The judgment applies and reinforces the settled multi-factor test for determining whether a private body qualifies as “State” under Article 12, and illustrates the difficulty of bringing educational institutions affiliated with defence establishments within that concept absent statutory creation, substantial public funding, or deep governmental control in the legal sense. The dissent reflects the ongoing tension in Indian constitutional law between formal criteria of State character and the functional reality of public service delivery by nominally private entities.
Frequently Asked Questions (F&Q)
Q1: What is the test for determining whether a body is “State” under Article 12 of the Constitution?
The Supreme Court has laid down a multi-factor test in Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi and subsequent decisions for determining whether a body qualifies as “State” under Article 12. The relevant factors include whether the body was created by or under a statute, whether it is financed substantially or wholly by government funds, whether the government exercises deep and pervasive control over its management, policies, and activities, whether the functions performed are essentially governmental or public in character, and whether the body enjoys a monopoly status conferred or protected by the State. No single factor is conclusive; the court examines the totality of the institutional arrangements.
Q2: Why did the majority hold that the Air Force School was not “State” under Article 12?
The majority held that the Air Force School at Bamrauli failed to satisfy the key criteria established for “State” character. The school was established by a registered private society and not by statute or government notification. Its funding derived primarily from tuition fees and welfare funds rather than government grants. The Education Code governing the school was not a statutory instrument. While the Air Force had a functional relationship with the school, the majority held that this did not amount to the deep and pervasive governmental control required to bring the school within Article 12.
Q3: What was the basis of Justice Amanullah’s dissent?
Justice Amanullah dissented on the ground that the Air Force’s close involvement in the financial and administrative affairs of the school, combined with the functional reality of the school as an institution serving the specific welfare needs of Air Force personnel, constituted sufficient State character for the purposes of Article 12. The learned judge emphasised that the performance of a public function, namely education, under the close supervision and institutional support of the Air Force, ought to attract the protections of constitutional remedies under Article 226. The dissent reflects a broader and more functional approach to the concept of “State” that prioritises the nature of the activity over formal legal structures.
Q4: What remedies remain available to employees of private bodies that are not “State” under Article 12?
Where an entity does not qualify as “State” under Article 12, its employees cannot maintain a writ petition under Article 226 or Article 32 for the enforcement of fundamental rights against that entity. However, such employees are not without remedy. They may pursue claims in the civil courts for breach of contract or wrongful termination. Where specific statutory protections apply, such as those under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 or applicable labour legislation, they may approach the relevant tribunals. The Supreme Court in this case specifically noted that the appellants’ dismissal of the writ petitions did not leave them without any available legal recourse.
Q5: Can a body performing public functions be brought within Article 12 even if it is a registered society?
The Supreme Court has held that the mere performance of public functions does not automatically bring a registered society or private body within the concept of “State” under Article 12. The Court has been consistent in requiring, in addition to the performance of public functions, evidence of deep governmental control, substantial government funding, or statutory creation before a private entity can be treated as “State”. However, the question remains a nuanced one, and the dissenting opinion in this case illustrates that a broad functional approach that focuses on the public character of the activity and the extent of governmental involvement may, in appropriate cases, support a different conclusion.
