Unreasoned Veto and the Federal Compact: The Tamil Nadu Anti-NEET Bill, Presidential Assent Under Article 200, and the Supreme Court’s Intervention
By Guru Legal
Keywords: Constitution of India, 1950; Article 131; Article 200; Article 201; Article 254(2); Article 47; Article 14; Presidential assent; Governor’s assent; NEET exemption; federalism; Tamil Nadu v. Union of India; State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamil Nadu; Concurrent List; Article 142; deemed assent; legislative autonomy; Basic Structure Doctrine; unreasoned executive action
Abstract
The decision of the President of India to withhold assent from the Bill passed by the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly in September 2021 to exempt the State of Tamil Nadu from the operation of the National Eligibility cum Entrance Test (hereinafter, NEET) for admission to medical colleges has generated a constitutional dispute of the first order, engaging fundamental questions about the nature and limits of the Presidential veto power under Article 201 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (hereinafter, the Constitution), the constitutional obligations of the Governor under Article 200, the scope of State legislative autonomy in the field of education on the Concurrent List, and the protection of India’s federal structure as a basic feature of the Constitution. The State of Tamil Nadu has filed an original suit under Article 131 of the Constitution before the Supreme Court of India, challenging the withholding of assent as patently unconstitutional, illegal, and arbitrary, on the grounds that the President acted mechanically on Union advice without furnishing reasons despite the State’s detailed responses to all ministerial queries, and that the Governor’s decision to reserve the re-passed Bill for the President rather than assenting to it as required by Article 200 was itself constitutionally impermissible. The suit invites the Supreme Court to declare the Bill deemed to have received assent, drawing upon the Court’s recent invocation of Article 142 to grant deemed assent for bills unconstitutionally delayed by Governors, as established in State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamil Nadu, decided in April 2025. This article examines the constitutional framework governing Presidential and Gubernatorial assent, analyses the Tamil Nadu suit and its constitutional foundations, and advances reform recommendations to address the structural deficiencies in the constitutional framework governing inter-governmental relations in the legislative domain.
Introduction
The relationship between the legislative authority of the State governments and the supervisory role of the Governor and the President of India in the legislative process is one of the most contested and consequential dimensions of Indian federalism. The Constitution of India, 1950, while establishing a federal structure with a strong Centre, recognises the legislative competence of the State Legislatures in respect of subjects enumerated in the State List (List II) of the Seventh Schedule and in the Concurrent List (List III) in conjunction with Parliament. The constitutional provisions governing the assent of the Governor and the President to Bills passed by State Legislatures, set out principally in Articles 200 and 201 of the Constitution, are the primary constitutional mechanism through which the Union government may exercise a degree of supervisory oversight over State legislation in areas of national significance.
The question of whether the President of India may withhold assent from a State Bill reserved for the President’s consideration under Article 200 without furnishing reasons, and whether such an unreasoned withholding of assent is subject to judicial review, has not been definitively resolved by the Supreme Court of India and constitutes one of the most significant unresolved questions in Indian constitutional law. The controversy surrounding the Tamil Nadu anti-NEET Bill, which was passed unanimously by the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly in September 2021 to exempt the State from the operation of NEET, provides an occasion for the Supreme Court to authoritatively address these questions in the context of a live constitutional dispute between the State of Tamil Nadu and the Union of India filed under Article 131 of the Constitution.
The constitutional stakes of the Tamil Nadu suit are substantial. At the level of immediate policy, the dispute concerns the constitutional validity of the exclusion of Tamil Nadu from the NEET framework, which the Justice A.K. Rajan Committee, constituted by the Government of Tamil Nadu to examine the impact of NEET on the State’s medical education system, found to be disproportionately harmful to students from rural, socio-economically disadvantaged, and Tamil-medium educational backgrounds, and to be inconsistent with the State government’s constitutional duty under Article 47 of the Constitution to raise the level of nutrition and the standard of living and to improve public health. At the level of constitutional principle, the dispute engages the foundational questions of whether the Presidential veto on State legislation is absolute and unreviewable, and whether the constitutional protection of federalism as a basic feature of the Constitution constrains the manner in which this power is exercised.
This article is organised in four parts. The first part examines the constitutional framework governing the assent process under Articles 200 and 201 of the Constitution and the doctrine of federalism as a basic constitutional feature. The second part analyses the specific constitutional contentions raised in the Tamil Nadu suit, including the arbitrariness challenge under Article 14 and the federalism challenge under Article 254(2). The third part examines the consequences of an unreasoned Presidential veto for the constitutional scheme of legislative relations between the Centre and the States. The fourth part advances reform recommendations.
The Constitutional Framework: Articles 200, 201, and the Federal Character of Legislative Assent
Article 200 of the Constitution of India, 1950 provides that when a Bill has been passed by the Legislature of a State, the Governor shall declare that the Governor assents to the Bill, or withholds assent therefrom, or reserves the Bill for the consideration of the President. The first proviso to Article 200 further provides that the Governor may return the Bill together with a message requesting the House or Houses to reconsider certain provisions, and that if the Bill is passed again by the House or Houses with or without amendment, the Governor shall not withhold assent therefrom. Article 201 provides that when a Bill is reserved by the Governor for the consideration of the President under Article 200, the President shall declare either that the President assents to the Bill or withholds assent therefrom, and that the President may also direct the Governor to return the Bill to the State Legislature with a message requesting reconsideration.
The constitutional text of Articles 200 and 201 does not expressly impose an obligation upon the Governor or the President to furnish reasons for withholding assent or for reserving a Bill for the President’s consideration, nor does it prescribe a time limit within which the President must act upon a Bill reserved under Article 200. These textual silences have generated significant constitutional controversy. In Nabam Rebia and Bamang Felix v. Deputy Speaker, Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly, (2016) 8 SCC 1, the Supreme Court of India held that the Governor’s discretionary powers under the Constitution are limited and must be exercised in accordance with established constitutional principles, including the principles of fairness and reasonableness. The court in State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamil Nadu, decided in April 2025, went further, holding that the Governor’s failure to act on Bills within a reasonable time was unconstitutional and invoking Article 142 of the Constitution to deem such Bills to have received assent. The Tamil Nadu anti-NEET suit invites the Court to extend this reasoning to the Presidential assent mechanism under Article 201.
The federal character of the Constitution of India, recognised as a basic feature of the Constitution in S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, (1994) 3 SCC 1, constitutes a significant constitutional constraint upon the manner in which the Presidential veto power may be exercised. The Concurrent List (List III) of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution includes education as a subject under Entry 25, following the Constitution (Forty-Second Amendment) Act, 1976, and Article 254(2) of the Constitution provides that where a State law in respect of a subject on the Concurrent List is repugnant to a Union law but receives the assent of the President, the State law shall prevail over the Union law in that State. The Tamil Nadu anti-NEET Bill was intended to operate as a State law under Article 254(2), designed to prevail over the relevant Union legislation governing NEET in Tamil Nadu. The withholding of Presidential assent thus has the direct effect of preventing the State from exercising its constitutional right under Article 254(2) to regulate education within its territory in a manner different from the Union’s approach, raising a substantial question about whether the Presidential veto can be exercised in a manner that effectively nullifies the State’s legislative autonomy in this domain.
The Tamil Nadu Suit: Constitutional Contentions, Presidential Action, and the Article 254(2) Controversy
The State of Tamil Nadu’s suit filed under Article 131 of the Constitution of India, 1950 before the Supreme Court of India presents several distinct constitutional contentions regarding the lawfulness of the President’s decision to withhold assent from the anti-NEET Bill. The first contention is that the withholding of assent is arbitrary and violates Article 14 of the Constitution, which prohibits arbitrary executive action, on the grounds that the President withheld assent mechanically on the advice of the Union government without providing any reasons, notwithstanding that the State had furnished detailed responses to all queries raised by Union ministries in the course of the consultation process. The principle that executive action that affects a party’s constitutional rights must be accompanied by reasons, even where no express statutory or constitutional obligation to furnish reasons exists, has been recognised by the Supreme Court in a long line of decisions, including in S.N. Mukherjee v. Union of India, (1990) 4 SCC 594.
The second constitutional contention raised in the Tamil Nadu suit concerns the interpretation of the first proviso to Article 200 of the Constitution. The State contends that when the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly re-passed the anti-NEET Bill after the Governor had returned it for reconsideration, the Governor was constitutionally obliged under the first proviso to Article 200 to assent to the re-passed Bill, and that the Governor’s decision to reserve the re-passed Bill for the President’s consideration rather than assenting to it was itself unconstitutional. The constitutional text of the first proviso appears to support this contention: it provides that if a Bill is passed again by the House or Houses with or without amendment, the Governor shall not withhold assent therefrom. The word shall in the proviso is directory and apparently leaves no discretion to the Governor to reserve the re-passed Bill for the President rather than assenting. If this interpretation is correct, the Governor’s reservation of the re-passed Bill was itself an unconstitutional act, rendering the President’s subsequent action upon the reserved Bill equally open to constitutional challenge.
The third and most audacious constitutional prayer in the Tamil Nadu suit is the request that the Supreme Court of India declare that the anti-NEET Bill is deemed to have received Presidential assent, on the basis of the principle recently established in State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamil Nadu, April 2025, wherein the Court invoked Article 142 of the Constitution to deem Bills unconstitutionally withheld by the Governor to have received assent. The extension of this principle from the Gubernatorial assent mechanism to the Presidential assent mechanism raises questions of considerable complexity, since the President acts on the advice of the Council of Ministers under Article 74 of the Constitution, whereas the Governor’s discretion is in principle independent of State government advice. Whether the deemed assent remedy under Article 142 is available against Presidential action taken on the advice of the Union government is a question that the Supreme Court has not previously addressed and that will require careful consideration of the constitutional relationship between Articles 74, 200, 201, and 142.
Consequences and Implications for Indian Federalism and Cooperative Governance
The implications of the Tamil Nadu anti-NEET suit extend far beyond the specific constitutional controversy over the assent process, touching upon the foundational question of the nature and scope of Indian federalism. The Supreme Court of India has, in S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, (1994) 3 SCC 1, and in subsequent decisions, consistently affirmed that federalism is a basic feature of the Constitution and that the federal balance between the Centre and the States must be preserved even in the exercise of constitutional powers that appear, on their face, to favour Central supremacy. If the Presidential veto over State legislation under Article 201 is held to be absolute and unreviewable, it would effectively convert the constitutional framework of the Concurrent List from a domain of cooperative legislative competence into one in which the Union government possesses an unreviewable power to negate State legislative initiatives, a conclusion that is difficult to reconcile with the constitutional protection of federalism as a basic feature.
Compounding this difficulty is the specific context of the NEET controversy, which has revealed the extent to which Union policies in the domain of education, now a Concurrent List subject, can adversely affect the access of students from marginalised backgrounds to medical education in States that have developed distinctive public health systems built upon different admission criteria. The Justice A.K. Rajan Committee’s empirical finding that NEET disproportionately disadvantaged students from rural, socio-economically disadvantaged, and Tamil-medium educational backgrounds, and that it undermined the State’s ability to fulfil its constitutional duty under Article 47 to improve public health, is a powerful illustration of the manner in which a uniform national standard can produce constitutionally inequitable outcomes in a country as diverse as India.
The Case for Reform: Legislative and Judicial Recommendations
The first area of reform concerns the prescription of a mandatory time limit within which the President must act on a Bill reserved under Article 200 of the Constitution of India, 1950. The absence of any time limit in the existing constitutional text has permitted situations in which State Bills are left in abeyance for extended periods without any action by the President, a situation that is detrimental both to the State’s legislative autonomy and to legal certainty. It is submitted that the Constitution ought to be amended to incorporate a provision analogous to Article 111, which governs Presidential assent to Union Bills, specifying a maximum period within which the President must either assent to or return a reserved Bill, failing which the Bill shall be deemed to have received assent.
The second area of reform pertains to the codification of an obligation upon the President to furnish reasons for withholding assent from a State Bill reserved under Article 200. It is submitted that an amendment to Article 201 of the Constitution ought to impose upon the President an express obligation to communicate in writing the reasons for withholding assent from a reserved Bill, so that the State Legislature and the courts are in a position to assess the constitutional validity of the President’s decision and, where appropriate, to challenge that decision before the Supreme Court of India under Article 131. The obligation to furnish reasons is a basic requirement of the rule of law and is fully consistent with the constitutional principle of judicial review established in Articles 32 and 226.
The third area of reform concerns the establishment of an inter-governmental mechanism for the resolution of disputes arising from the legislative assent process. It is submitted that Parliament ought to enact legislation establishing an Inter-Governmental Legislative Council, comprising representatives of the Central and State governments, empowered to mediate disputes arising from the refusal or withholding of assent to State Bills by the Governor or the President, and to make recommendations to the President regarding the appropriate course of action. Such a body would provide a structured forum for cooperative governance in the legislative domain and would reduce the need for recourse to adversarial constitutional litigation under Article 131.
The fourth area of reform addresses the constitutional position of the Governor in the legislative assent process. It is submitted that the Supreme Court of India’s decision in State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamil Nadu, April 2025, which established the principle of deemed assent for Bills unconstitutionally delayed by the Governor, ought to be given statutory expression by an amendment to Article 200 expressly prescribing time limits for Gubernatorial action on Bills and providing that the Governor’s failure to act within the prescribed period, or the Governor’s reservation of a re-passed Bill in contravention of the first proviso to Article 200, shall be without constitutional effect.
The fifth area of reform pertains to the constitutional framework governing the Concurrent List and the protection of State legislative autonomy within it. It is submitted that the Law Commission of India ought to be tasked with conducting a comprehensive review of the Concurrent List, with particular attention to the subjects that have been added to the Concurrent List by constitutional amendment since 1950, including education under Entry 25, with a view to identifying which subjects ought to remain on the Concurrent List, which ought to be transferred to the State List, and whether the constitutional framework for cooperative federalism in the legislative domain requires revision to ensure that State governments retain meaningful legislative autonomy in areas of social policy that directly affect the wellbeing of their populations.
Conclusion
The constitutional dispute arising from the President’s withholding of assent to the Tamil Nadu anti-NEET Bill represents a defining moment in the evolution of Indian federalism and in the constitutional jurisprudence governing the legislative relationship between the Centre and the States. The State of Tamil Nadu’s suit under Article 131 of the Constitution of India, 1950 raises questions of profound constitutional importance regarding the reviewability of the Presidential veto, the constitutional obligations of the Governor under the first proviso to Article 200, the protection of State legislative autonomy under Article 254(2), and the availability of the deemed assent remedy under Article 142 in the context of Presidential action. It is submitted that the Supreme Court of India’s resolution of these questions will have enduring consequences for the constitutional architecture of Indian federalism and for the ability of State governments to exercise meaningful legislative autonomy in the domain of social policy. The structural reforms recommended in this article, including the prescription of time limits for Presidential action, the codification of an obligation to furnish reasons, and the establishment of an inter-governmental legislative council, are essential components of a constitutionally sound framework for cooperative federalism that is capable of sustaining the federal compact upon which the Republic of India is founded.
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ)
Q1. What is the constitutional basis of the President’s power to withhold assent from a Bill passed by a State Legislature and reserved by the Governor?
The President’s power to withhold assent from a Bill reserved by the Governor of a State for the President’s consideration is conferred by Article 201 of the Constitution of India, 1950. Article 201 provides that when a Bill has been reserved by the Governor under Article 200 for the consideration of the President, the President shall declare either that the President assents to the Bill or withholds assent therefrom. The President may also direct the Governor to return the Bill to the State Legislature with a message requesting reconsideration of the Bill or certain provisions thereof. The constitutional text of Article 201 does not prescribe a time limit within which the President must act or an obligation to furnish reasons for withholding assent, although the Supreme Court of India has recognised that executive action affecting constitutional rights must generally be accompanied by reasons, as articulated in S.N. Mukherjee v. Union of India, (1990) 4 SCC 594.
Q2. What legal recourse is available to a State government aggrieved by the President’s withholding of assent to a State Bill?
A State government aggrieved by the President’s withholding of assent to a State Bill reserved under Article 200 of the Constitution of India, 1950 may file an original suit before the Supreme Court of India under Article 131 of the Constitution, which confers original jurisdiction upon the Supreme Court in disputes between the Government of India and one or more States, or between two or more States, involving a question of law or fact on which the existence or extent of a legal right depends. In the present instance, the State of Tamil Nadu has invoked precisely this remedy by filing a suit under Article 131 challenging the withholding of Presidential assent as unconstitutional and arbitrary. The State may also seek interim relief from the Supreme Court, including a stay of the President’s order withholding assent, pending the final determination of the suit. Additionally, the State may request the Supreme Court to invoke its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 142 to declare the Bill deemed to have received assent, as it has done in the Tamil Nadu anti-NEET litigation.
Q3. What is the significance of Article 254(2) of the Constitution in the context of the Tamil Nadu anti-NEET Bill?
Article 254(2) of the Constitution of India, 1950 provides that where a State law in respect of a subject enumerated in the Concurrent List (List III) of the Seventh Schedule is repugnant to an existing Union law, but has received the assent of the President, the State law shall prevail in that State. This provision constitutes an important constitutional safety valve that allows State governments to enact legislation on Concurrent List subjects that departs from Union legislation, subject to the obtaining of Presidential assent. In the context of the Tamil Nadu anti-NEET Bill, Article 254(2) is directly relevant because education, the subject matter of the Bill, is a Concurrent List subject under Entry 25 following the Constitution (Forty-Second Amendment) Act, 1976, and the Bill was specifically designed to prevail in Tamil Nadu over the Union’s NEET framework by virtue of Article 254(2). The withholding of Presidential assent has the effect of preventing Tamil Nadu from exercising its constitutional right under Article 254(2) to regulate medical admissions in a manner different from the Union’s approach.
Q4. What obligation does the Governor bear under the first proviso to Article 200 in relation to Bills re-passed by the State Legislature?
The first proviso to Article 200 of the Constitution of India, 1950 provides that if a Bill returned by the Governor with a message requesting reconsideration is passed again by the House or Houses of the State Legislature with or without amendment, the Governor shall not withhold assent therefrom. The use of the word shall in this proviso indicates that the Governor’s obligation to assent to a re-passed Bill is mandatory and admits of no discretion on the part of the Governor to withhold assent or to reserve the re-passed Bill for the consideration of the President. The Supreme Court of India’s decision in State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamil Nadu, April 2025, affirmed that the Governor’s failure to act on Bills within a reasonable time is unconstitutional and resulted in the Court invoking Article 142 to deem such Bills to have received assent. The Tamil Nadu anti-NEET suit raises the specific question of whether the Governor’s reservation of the re-passed anti-NEET Bill for Presidential consideration, rather than assenting to it as required by the first proviso to Article 200, was itself a constitutionally impermissible act.
Q5. What are the constitutional limitations on the Supreme Court’s power to grant deemed assent to a State Bill under Article 142?
Article 142 of the Constitution of India, 1950 confers upon the Supreme Court of India the power to pass such decree or make such order as is necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending before it. The Supreme Court has invoked Article 142 in cases of unconstitutional delay or inaction by constitutional functionaries, including Governors, to grant deemed assent to State Bills that have been unconstitutionally withheld. The limitations on the Court’s power under Article 142 are, however, significant: the power cannot be exercised to override express constitutional provisions or to supplement the constitutional scheme in a manner contrary to the constitutional text. Whether Article 142 may be invoked to grant deemed Presidential assent to a Bill reserved under Article 200, where the President’s withholding of assent is challenged as unconstitutional, is a question not yet directly addressed by the Supreme Court, and its resolution will require careful consideration of whether the President’s action is subject to judicial review and whether the remedy of deemed assent is constitutionally appropriate in the context of the Presidential assent mechanism under Article 201.
Bibliography
Primary Sources
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– State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamil Nadu, Supreme Court of India, April 2025 (unreported).
– S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, (1994) 3 SCC 1 (Supreme Court of India).
– Nabam Rebia and Bamang Felix v. Deputy Speaker, Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly, (2016) 8 SCC 1 (Supreme Court of India).
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